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ABSTRACT
Most commercial litigation financing agreements are designed to
create distance between the funders of the litigation and legal counsel.
Our legal system demands that third party litigation financiers refrain
from interfering with a client’s decisions in their matter, and traditional
third-party litigation financing is merely a passive profit-making opportunity. There are cases, however, where the litigation financier is not interested in making a profit, but instead wishes to participate in the litigation for political, ideological, or personal reasons. In this article, I will
explore whether what I call “interested litigation financing” is an exercise of First Amendment rights or is instead a corruption of the litigation
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process. It is simple to imagine a scenario where interested financiers take
control of litigation; but by examining two recent cases demonstrating
third-party interested litigation financing, I argue that interested litigation financing furthers the public values underlying our legal system and
poses little risk to the professional responsibility obligations of lawyers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his 2013 Miller-Becker Lecture, Bruce Green explored the
sometimes-shifting meaning of the ideal of professional independence.1
Is it the independence of the bar, to engage in self-regulation, free from
interference by legislatures and the executive branch?2 Or, is it the
independence of lawyers from other professionals, such as accountants,
who may wish to form multidisciplinary practices that threaten to corrupt
ideals of professionalism with the morals of the marketplace?3
Alternatively, is the relevant sense of independence the distance
maintained by individual lawyers from powerful clients, which enables
them to say to a client, “Yes, the law lets you do that, but don’t do it. It is
a rotten thing to do”? 4 Green argues that a forgotten but important
conception of professional independence is that of lawyers from the
judiciary. 5 Lawyers are of course traditionally referred to as officers of
the court, and the rules of professional conduct regulating lawyers are
promulgated under the inherent authority of states’ appellate courts. 6 As
∗

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This paper was
written for the 2018 Distinguished Lecture for the Joseph G. Miller and William C. Becker Center
for Professional Responsibility. Thanks to the Miller-Becker Center and its faculty director, Professor Jack Sahl, for the invitation to present this lecture. The author gratefully acknowledges the research funding provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established by the William C. and Joyce C. O’Neil Charitable Trust to honor the memory of Judge
Conway, Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals from 1954 to 1959, and his son,
Hewitt A. Conway, a member of the Cornell Law School Class of 1949. By way of disclosure, I occasionally serve as outside ethics counsel for commercial litigation financing companies.
1. Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued, 46
AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul
Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097
(2000).
4. Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, quoted in MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION
UNDER LAWYERS 35 (1994). For accounts of the Nineteenth-Century ideal of professional
independence as a brake on the anti-social conduct of powerful clients, see Rebecca Roiphe, The
Decline of Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 649 (2016); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
5. Green, supra note 2, at 620-38.
6. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.6, at 17-18, § 2.2.2, at 24-27
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Green points out, however, excessive deference to judges threatens the
autonomy that is essential to a highly fiduciary lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers who pull their punches out of “fear of judicial disfavor”
compromise the duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy that they owe to
clients. 7 Sometimes lawyers should be willing to disobey court orders in
the pursuit of their clients’ rights.8
In this Lecture I would like to consider one aspect of the professional
independence of lawyers, which is related to, but distinct from the subject
of Green’s 2013 Lecture. The old aphorism, the one who pays the piper
calls the tune, suggests that lawyers ought to exercise great care to ensure
that the means by which they finance the representation of clients does
not interfere with their judgment exercised on behalf of clients. In other
words, there is a tension between the business and professional aspects of
the practice of law. Third-party litigation financing is sometimes criticized
for interfering with the independence of lawyers. This conception of
independence is not focused on the identity of regulators (the judiciary vs.
legislatures), the influence of powerful clients, or excessive deference to
judges. Rather, the concern is that funders will seek to influence the
handling by counsel of a claimant’s lawsuit. Implicit in this critique of
third-party financing is the assumption that it would be a bad thing if a
non-lawyer sought to exert any control over the decisions made by either
the lawyer or the client in connection with the litigation.
The question to be addressed in this Lecture is not so much whether
third-party interference is likely. Most commercial litigation financing
transactions are structured to create a discreet distance between funders
and the lawyers representing the claimant. Litigation financing contracts
expressly disclaim any right to interfere with counsel’s handling of
litigation, 9 and the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance,
where they are still recognized, require that a third-party funder be a
purely passive investor. 10 To put it bluntly, commercial litigation

(1986).
7. Green, supra note 2, at 624 (quoting AM. B. ASS’N, CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS, Canon 1
(1908)).
8. Id. at 632-33.
9. See, e.g., Charge Injection Techs., Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 2016 WL
937400, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2016); Miller U.K., Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.Supp.3d 711,
740 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (in camera review of financing agreement shows no assertion of control over the
case or settlement by the funder); see also Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation
Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L. REV. 711, 737-38 (2014) (recommending that litigation financing
agreements make clear that the funder has no right to control the conduct of litigation and particularly
undertakes to avoid interference with decisions regarding settlement).
10. See, e.g., Abu-Ghazaleh v. Chaul, 36 So.3d 691, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Odell v.
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financing companies do not have any view one way or the other about the
merits of the underlying matter, other than as a profit-making opportunity.
Call this practice disinterested litigation financing.
There may be cases, however, in which the party financing the
litigation is not aiming at turning a profit on its investment, but rather
wishes to participate in the matter for political, ideological, or even
personal reasons. The financier still may not exercise direct control, but
the monetary support is nevertheless helpful in advancing the financier’s
cause. In this way, litigation financing is like donating to the fundraising
committee of a candidate for political office,11 or giving money to a
public-interest organization that has as one of its characteristic activities
the financing of litigation. Whether what I will call interested litigation
financing is best understood as the exercise of a First Amendment right or
corruption of a process that should remain untainted by money is one of
the themes to be explored in this Lecture. Two recent cases illustrate thirdparty funding which is motivated by some sympathy for the ideology or
legal position of the plaintiff in the underlying litigation, which is absent
in ordinary, purely financially-motivated commercial funding deals.
The first case involves a lawsuit for invasion of privacy. In May
2016, the New York Times reported that Terry Bollea, the professional
wrestler known by his nom de guerre Hulk Hogan, may have had
undisclosed financial backing in his lawsuit against Gawker Media, an
online media company, for publishing a sex tape featuring Hogan and the
wife of his best friend, Bubba “The Love Sponge” Clem (really). 12
Hogan’s lawyer at one point dismissed a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, which had the effect of letting Gawker’s insurer off
the hook for coverage (the sole remaining claims falling within the

Legal Bucks LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 774 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v.
Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 104 (Tex. App. 1st 2006); Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp.,
789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003); Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 906 (R.I. 2002);
Kraft v. Mason, 668 So.2d 679 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996).
11. See W. Bradley Wendel, Litigation Trolls, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 725 (2016) (developing
the analogy between litigation financing and campaign fundraising, and discussing the First
Amendment arguments in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015)). As
Eugene Kontorovich points out, “[a]nyone who donates to the ACLU or a Legal Aid fund is basically
underwriting third-party litigation.” Eugene Kontorovich, Peter Thiel’s Funding of Hulk HoganGawker Litigation Should Not Raise Concerns, WASH. POST (May 26, 2016). He correctly refers to
the holding in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), that the application of state prohibitions on
champerty and maintenance – that is, third-party financial support for litigation – may violate the First
Amendment as applied to the activities of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in that case.
12. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gawker Founder Suspects a Common Financer Behind
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016). For the whole sordid story, see Jeffrey Toobin, Gawker’s
Demise and the Trump-Era Threat to the First Amendment, NEW YORKER (Dec. 19 & 26, 2016).
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policy’s intentional-acts exclusion). Hogan was also rumored to have
turned down substantial settlement offers. 13 The financial backer of the
suit was rumored to be billionaire Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal, who
had a longstanding grudge against Gawker for attempting to out him
before he was open about his sexuality. 14 Thiel was not in it for the money.
He later admitted to bankrolling the litigation in the amount of about $10
million, and said that he did it not for revenge but for “specific
deterrence,” saying that he “saw Gawker pioneer a unique and incredibly
damaging way of getting attention by bullying people even when there
was no connection with the public interest.” 15 The lawsuit resulted in an
award to Hogan of $115 million in compensatory damages and $25
million in punitive damages 16 and a subsequent bankruptcy filing by
Gawker. 17
The second case arises out of an effort by Uruguay to adopt effective
tobacco-control measures to combat one of the highest smoking rates in
Latin America. 18 The tobacco company Philip Morris brought an investorstate arbitration proceeding, arguing that the regulations expropriated its
investment in Uruguay and denied its right to equal and fair treatment
under a bilateral investment treaty. The arbitration panel concluded that
Uruguay’s regulations did not indirectly expropriate the intellectual
property of the tobacco company, in part because the regulations were a
valid exercise of the state’s police power, as recognized by customary
international law. 19

13. See Felix Salmon, Peter Thiel Just Gave Other Billionaires a Dangerous Blueprint for
Perverting Philanthropy, SPLINTER, (May 25, 2016), https://splinternews.com/peter-thiel-just-gaveother-billionaires-a-dangerous-bl-1793857041 (“Hogan could have accepted a substantial financial
settlement; he could also have made it much more likely that he would get paid, by suing in such a
manner as to make Gawker’s insurance company liable for any verdict. Instead, he refused all
settlements, and withdrew the insurable complaints, to ensure that the company itself would incur as
much damage as possible.”); Ryan Mac & Matt Drange, This Silicon Valley Billionaire Has Been
Secretly Funding Hulk Hogan’s Lawsuits Against Gawker, FORBES (May 24, 2016).
14. See, e.g., Mac & Drange, supra note 14.
15. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire, Reveals Secret War with Gawker,
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016).
16. See Eriq Gardner, Judge Upholds Hulk Hogan’s $140 Million Trial Victory Against
Gawker, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (May 25, 2016).
17. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Thiel Makes a Bid for Gawker.com, a Site He Helped
Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2018). Hogan and Gawker settled for $32 million. See Matt Drange,
Peter Thiel’s War on Gawker: A Timeline, FORBES (June 21, 2016).
18. See Harv. L. Rev., International Arbitration - Investor-State Dispute Settlement - Tribunal
Holds That Uruguay’s Anti-Tobacco Regulations Do Not Violate Philip Morris’s Investment Rights,
130 HARV. L. REV. 1986 (2017).
19. Id. at 1988.
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As for the claim of unfair and unequal treatment, the panel found that
the regulations were a good faith, reasonable effort to address a valid
public health concern. 20 For the purposes of this Lecture, the most
compelling feature of the case is the prospect of a wealthy multinational
corporation using the investor-state arbitration process to burden states,
particularly developing countries like Uruguay, as a way of chilling the
development of regulations that would be against the economic interests
of the private companies. Despite a cost bill of $7 million assessed against
Philip Morris, Uruguay was still stuck with $2.6 million in expenses for
defending its public health regulations. 21 Threats of costly litigation
against big tobacco companies apparently deterred Canada, the European
Union, and New Zealand from enacting more aggressive anti-smoking
regulations. 22 While the panel’s decision on the substance may be viewed
as “an unequivocal landmark rebuke” of the tobacco industry’s litigation
strategy, 23 it is noteworthy that the state of Uruguay had obtained
financing from a third party to support its litigation strategy. 24 As in the
Hulk Hogan case, the funder was an interested party who was not in it for
the money, namely the Bloomberg Foundation’s Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids. 25
Most litigation financing is backed by investors with frankly
financial motives. For example, a number of consumer litigation funding
companies were criticized in a New York Times article for advertising cash
advances to women pursuing sexual harassment claims against their
employers, which appeared to be an opportunistic attempt to profit from
the #MeToo movement. 26 (One could imagine a funder making an effort
to fund workplace sexual harassment claims as part of an effort to further
women’s equality, but some feminist critics have called this funding a

20. Id. at 1988-89.
21. Id. at 1991.
22. Id. (citing HOLLY JARMAN, THE POLITICS OF TRADE AND TOBACCO CONTROL (2015)).
23. Harold Hongju Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human Rights Imperative,
57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 433, 447 (2016).
24. See Eric De Brabandere,”Mercantile Adventurers”? The Disclosure of Third-Party
Funding in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LITIGATION, COSTS, FUNDING AND BEHAVIOUR –
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW 4 n.22 (Willem van Boom ed., 2017).
25. See id. (citing a press release by Foley Hoag LLP, counsel for Uruguay in the arbitration
proceeding,
“Government of Uruguay Taps Foley Hoag for Representation in International Arbitration Brought
by Philip Morris to Overturn Country’s Tobacco Regulations” (Oct. 8 2010),
http://www.foleyhoag.com/news-and-events/news/2010/october/uruguay-taps-foley-hoag-forrepresentation [http://perma.cc/CBX2-PUFR]).
26. See Matthew Goldstein & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, How the Finance Industry Is Trying
to Cash In on #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2018).
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“scuzzy new low,” because the funders view the plaintiffs as merely an
economic opportunity, not an ally in a cause. 27)
As Section II will show, the usual case for litigation financing is an
economic one, based on considerations such as leveling the playing field
between litigants with differing access to capital, shifting risk to parties
better able to bear it, and smoothing out cash flows related to litigation
expenses. Proponents of litigation financing often analogize it to other,
already generally accepted financing mechanisms, such as contingency
fees and liability insurance. 28 Section III then asks whether if we accept
the economic case for litigation financing, are we thereby committed to
allowing interested third parties to fund lawsuits? Conversely, is one who
believes, on First Amendment or similar grounds, that people ought to
have the right to express their political viewpoints by financing test case
litigation, required to support purely financially motivated third-party
funding? The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, is a fierce critic
of commercial litigation financing, 29 but it also provides substantial
support to parties in litigation around the country who are taking a probusiness position. 30 Is it possible to have it both ways, by opposing
financing of litigation where the motivation is merely to make a profit,
and where ideological considerations take a back seat to an impartial
assessment of the merits of the lawsuit, while supporting “cause
lawyering” on either side, for the ACLU or the Chamber of Commerce?
If the answer is that these cases must be treated differently, the further
question is whether it is the motives of the financier or something else,
such as the degree of control exercised over the conduct of litigation by
the third-party, that makes the difference in the normative analysis.
Section IV sets out a theoretical account of the purposes of litigation to
help answer the question of whether third-party control should be viewed
as a threat. Section V argues that the ethical duties of lawyers provide a
27. See Megan Reynolds, The Finance Industry is Trying Its Best to Cash in On Sexual
Harassment and #MeToo, JEZEBEL (Jan. 19, 2018).
28. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, A Legal Ethics Perspective on Alternative Litigation
Financing, 55 CAN. BUS. L.J. 133 (2014). Critics of litigation financing struggle to explain, without
begging the question, the difference between these accepted financing techniques and commercial
plaintiffs’-side funding as provided by firms like Burford and Bentham IMF. See, e.g., Michelle
Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation Participation, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 673 (2012).
29. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, US Chamber Pushes Rule to Expose Litigation Funding,
LAW.COM (June 2, 2017) https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202788262307/USChamber-Pushes-Rule-to-Expose-Litigation-Funding/ [https://perma.cc/5CHT-5GF4].
(2016)
30. See,
e.g.,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE CHAMBER OF LITIGATION
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/chamber_litigation_report_part_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DT9M-KA5K].
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sufficient counterweight to any influence exerted by a funder. Finally
Section VI considers the related issue of transparency and disclosure of
litigation financing arrangements.
II. PROBLEMS TO WHICH DISINTERESTED LITIGATION FINANCING IS
INTENDED AS THE SOLUTION
We are approaching the point at which it is no longer necessary to
begin every paper on third-party litigation financing with a lengthy
explanation of what it is. Third-party litigation financing (also known as
alternative litigation financing or litigation funding) differs from
contingency-fee and liability-insurance financing only in the identity of
the party providing support. Instead of a liability insurer or the plaintiff’s
counsel, the financier is a specialized entity formed to invest in lawsuits.31
It may be a division of a larger financial institution or it may be a
freestanding company or fund. The market for investment in litigation is
often described as small but growing rapidly. The New York City Bar
Association estimated in 2011 that as much as $1 billion has been invested
by third-party financers in lawsuits. 32 In February 2015, Chicago Lawyer
magazine reported that Burford Capital, a large commercial litigation
31. See generally STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED
STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS (2010) https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXR2-XY9N]; Anthony J.
Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort
and Contract Norms when the Deal Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1831 (2013); Jeremy Kidd, To
Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 613 (2012); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation
Funding Comes to Law, 43 AKRON L. REV. 677 (2010). Some of the debate over litigation financing
pertains to the consumer sector, which offers claimholders in small, often personal-injury cases, to
monetize the expected value of a future settlement or judgment. That type of financing practice, and
that sector of the industry, is largely peripheral to the issues discussed here. Issues related to consumer
litigation financing are similar to those relating to other consumer-credit transactions, such as whether
financing parties are failing to provide adequate disclosure, whether transactional terms are
substantively fair, and whether additional regulation (and by what institution) is required. See, e.g.,
Ronen Avraham & Anthony J. Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer Litigation
Funding, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); General Thurbert Baker, Paying to Play: Inside
the Ethics and Implications of Third-Party Litigation Funding, 23 WIDENER L.J. 229, 232 (2013);
Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal to
Bring Litigation Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750
(2012); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in
the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83 (2008); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding:
Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation
Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004).
32. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011).
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investment firm, had $18 million in profits in 2014 and had made new
investments totaling $62 million in cases in that year. 33
The following two scenarios illustrate what all of that money is doing
in the civil justice system. They both represent instances of disinterested
litigation financing, in which the funder is merely in it for the money and
does not have a view one way or the other on the public-policy issues
presented in the litigation.
A.

Scenario #1: David vs. Goliath 34

Hydraulic excavators, backhoes, and other earth-moving machines
are used in the mining and construction industries. They are versatile and
can be fitted with different types of digging tools, such as buckets and
hammers. The problem for operators is that changing between different
types of tools is time-consuming, and on a big job, time is money. A small
family-owned business with 100 employees came up with an ingenious
solution—an automatic coupling device that greatly simplified the process
of changing tools. A huge multinational manufacturer of construction
equipment soon became its biggest customer. Eventually, the small
business and the large manufacture decided to become partners. They
entered into a manufacturing agreement under which the large company
would manufacture and distribute the couplers based on the small
company’s technology. A few years later, the big manufacturer terminated
the contract and began marketing its own automatic coupling devices. The
small business had to lay off 75% of its workforce after the termination of
the contract and the competition by the large manufacturer. The small
company, believing the large manufacturer had stolen its trade secrets,
filed a lawsuit, but quickly realized that the much larger and better
financed defendant would do all it could to delay and drive up the costs
of the litigation. The company asked— practically begged—its law firm
to represent it on a contingent-fee basis, but the law firm did not allow
partners to take on that much risk. And indeed, as it feared, lawyers for
the large manufacturer began filing a barrage of procedural motions and

33. Roy Strom, Numbers Never Lie – Or Do They?, CHICAGO LAWYER (Feb. 1, 2015)
https://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/archives/2015/02/litigation-funding-business.aspx
[https//perma.cc/336Z-MK6Y].
34. This problem is based on the breach of trade secrets lawsuit filed by a small British
company, Miller, U.K., Ltd., against the multinational corporation Caterpillar. It led to a landmark
opinion on the discoverability of documents shared with a third-party financing company. See Miller
UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.Supp.3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The discussion in the Miller opinion
of discoverability of the existence of litigation financing and the underlying “deal documents” will be
considered below. See infra notes 167 - 78, and accompanying text.
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issuing onerous discovery requests, apparently hoping to take advantage
of the substantial disparity in resources between the parties.
Then the small company learned about XYZ Capital Partners. XYZ
offered to invest an initial $2 million in the litigation. The small company
would be contractually obligated to use the funds to pay its law firm’s
hourly fees. In exchange, XYZ would be entitled to receive, from any
proceeds of the litigation obtained by way of judgment or settlement, on
a “first money out” basis, the return of its $2 million investment plus a
premium calculated as a multiplier of its investment, with the multiplier
increasing over time. 35 For example, if the company obtained a favorable
result within a year, XYZ would be entitled to twice (2x) its invested
amount; for a result between one and three years, three times (3x); and so
on, with a cap at 4x. The investment would be without recourse, meaning
that if the company recovered nothing in the lawsuit, it would have no
obligation to repay XYZ’s investment. The company and XYZ agreed that
further investments in $2 million tranches could be made, on the same
terms, if both parties agreed. In the investment agreement, XYZ
confirmed the right to receive periodic updates on the status of the
litigation and to be consulted regarding any potential settlement. The
agreement expressly stated, however, that any decisions regarding
settlement were exclusively for the company to make.
The small company and XYZ entered into the investment agreement.
With the client’s permission, the law firm representing the small company
revealed to the defendant, the large manufacturer, that they had secured
litigation funding and the identity of the funder. Because XYZ had a
reputation for carefully evaluating potential investments, the defendant
took this as a sign that the small company’s case likely had merit. It also
realized that it would not be able to grind down the small company in a
war of attrition. It began to reconsider its strategy in the case, and to think
about whether it would be worth offering a reasonable, early settlement
offer. 36

35. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of a
Solution: The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 941-42 (2015)
(describing typical features of commercial litigation financing contracts); Maya Steinitz, The
Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012) (same).
36. In the case upon which this hypothetical is based, the parties did not settle, but the thirdparty funding enabled the small company to go all the way to trial, where it obtained a substantial
jury verdict against the large manufacturer for misuse of its trade secrets. See Nate Raymond,
Caterpillar Hit with $73.6 Million Trade Secrets Verdict in U.S., REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2015)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-caterpillar-lawsuit-idUSKBN0U424I20151221
[https://perma.cc/V4E9-45B3]; Michal Addady, Caterpillar Found Guilty of Stealing Trade Secrets,
FORTUNE (Dec. 22, 2015).
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Scenario #2: Law Firm Risk Management and Access to Capital 37

The law firm of Duncan, Ginobili & Parker is considered a large firm
in its home city, but by national standards it is fairly small. Its 250 lawyers
practice in a wide variety of areas, but it is best known for its litigation
practice. Things appear to be going well for the firm, but the managing
partner is a forward-thinking lawyer and realizes that the market for legal
services is rapidly changing. Corporate clients are bringing a great deal of
routine legal work in-house, clients with cases across the country are
consolidating their outside counsel and relying on a small number of
select law firms (often in exchange for discounted fees), and clients are
exerting considerable pressure to rethink traditional hourly billing
arrangements, demanding instead project-based flat fees or hybrid
hourly/contingency structures that better align the interests of the client
and law firm. 38
The managing partner realizes that her firm will have to compete
effectively not only for clients, but to attract and retain talented lawyers.
This goal has put pressure on the firm’s existing sources of financing. 39
Already the firm has moved from a lockstep compensation system to one
in which partners may receive a bonus based on cases they originate. The
37. There is some talk in the legal press about the significance of litigation financing for small
and boutique law firms. See, e.g., Monika Mesa, Litigation Funding Changes Legal Landscape for
BUS.
REV.
(Nov.
22,
2017)
Boutique
and
Small
Firms,
DAILY
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/sites/dailybusinessreview/2017/11/20/litigation-fundingchanges-the-legal-landscape-for-boutique-and-small-firms/?slreturn=20180801214506
[https://perma.cc/VAY8-NYNB]. The benefits of litigation financing are, not surprisingly, frequently
touted in pitch documents prepared by funders. See, e.g., Wellfleet Advisors, Guide to Litigation
Financing
(2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
litigation/materials/2015_spring_leadership_meeting/guide_to_litigation_financing_may_2014_cha
rles_agee.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ4Y-QEZA]; Finance for the Future of Law Firms:
How
Burford
Helps
Law
Firms
(2018),
http://www.burfordcapital.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Burford_Law_Firm_Solutions_US_March_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QG4D-MQU5].
38. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 529 (1978).
39. See Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law In the Twenty-First Century In a Twentieth
(Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has To Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 481
(2012) (“The traditional law firm practice model requires that firms are either self-funded—the
partners contribute to the capital needs of the firm by devoting a portion of each partners share to the
capital needs of the firm—or the firm must borrow from outside sources, usually banks.”); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over
Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1726- 1727 (2008) (Attorneys are “restricted to
the plowed-back profits and owner-manager mechanisms that financed companies in the latenineteenth century before the advent of the modern corporation, which brought with it the separation
of ownership and control and the explosion of stock markets and financial institutions that prompted
significant economic growth in the first part of the twentieth century.”)
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firm has thus been able to keep some of its most entrepreneurial junior
partners who otherwise might have been tempted to jump ship. But many
of these partners have been asking to take on riskier cases, often on a full
or partial contingent-fee basis, and to expand into new areas of practice
such as international arbitration and qui tam litigation. 40
The firm has traditionally shied away from contingent-fee work, not
wanting to take on the risk of nonpayment and the delay while cases
proceed to a collectable judgment or settlement. Many of the more senior
lawyers in the firm have grumbled privately about what they perceive as
go-getter junior partners who are willing to saddle the firm with
considerable risk while they enjoy the upside of revenue from clients who
insist on alternatives to the hourly billing the firm has long been
accustomed to. The firm has approached commercial banks about
establishing a line of credit to finance the costs of contingency-fee cases,
but the banks were reluctant to consider extending ordinary secured loans
using litigation proceeds as collateral, reasoning that it was impossible for
bank loan officers to assign a value to the inherently uncertain results of
litigation.
The managing partner recently met with representatives of Law Firm
Financing, Inc. (LFFI), an investment company that specializes in
providing capital to law firms. The funds can be used to pay the hard costs
of litigation (such as experts and e-discovery vendors), as well as paying
overhead expenses, thus keeping the firm from having its own capital
deployed for a lengthy period prior to any recovery. Clients appreciate
funding for litigation expenses because they can defer the cost of litigation
until it is resolved.
These investments are unlike an ordinary commercial line of credit
in that they are not secured by the firm’s general accounts receivable and
other assets. Instead, LFFI’s entitlement to be repaid comes only from a
portfolio of specified cases. The transaction is not in the form of a loan,
but a non-recourse investment. The portfolio structure essentially crosscollateralizes LFFI’s return, so that it is not dependent upon the results in
any particular matter. LFFI is a purely passive investor and has no
involvement in the law firm’s management of litigation. Due to the greater
risk involved, as compared with ordinary secured lending, the returns due
to LFFI are considerably higher.
In general, returns are calculated as in the first scenario, as multiples
of the amount invested, with the multiplier increasing over time. On the
40. See Jonathan T. Molot, What’s Wrong with Law Firms?: A Corporate Finance Solution to
Law Firm Short-Termism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2014).
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benefit side, however, the LFFI investments substantially reduce the risk
associated with contingent-fee representation. While LFFI captures some
of the upside of a successfully litigated matter, the law firm retains enough
interest to compensate the lawyers who pursue these cases. It therefore
allows for a fairer compensation system that still gives the firm a strong
position in a highly competitive marketplace. The law firm further
benefits from avoiding taking on debt which, as the managing partner is
well aware, was a factor in numerous recent law firm dissolutions.
C.

Functions of Disinterested Litigation Financing

The two scenarios presented above are admittedly rosy, but they
represent the best case for financing of large commercial lawsuits.41 The
claim is that, by assuming the financing and risk-taking function that
would otherwise be performed either by claimants or their lawyers,
litigation financing firms enhance access to justice. 42 Contingent-fee
financing is, of course, also defended as a means of enhancing access to
justice, but it requires lawyers to advance the cost of their unbilled time,

41. Picking up on the distinction made by two sociologists between two “hemispheres” of legal
practice – individual-client and corporate representation – there are two different hemispheres of the
litigation financing industry. This lecture is concerned with the commercial hemisphere, which is
characterized by individually negotiated investments, often with the involvement of in-house or
outside counsel for the claimant; significant time and resources dedicated to conducting due diligence
on a claim before an investment is made, sometimes involving sharing of documents protected by the
attorney-client privilege or as attorney work product; and the likelihood of recovering significant
damages – generally in the eight-figure range. The consumer hemisphere, for the most part, is oriented
toward monetizing relatively low-value personal-injury claims. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915
So.2d 626, 630 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005); see also Ronen Avraham & Anthony J. Sebok, An Empirical
Investigation of Third Party Consumer Litigation Funding, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2018). For example, a self-employed carpenter injured in an auto accident may face significant lost
wages and medical expenses while waiting for a judgment or settlement in a tort lawsuit. Using the
numbers on the Avraham & Sebok article, a consumer litigation funding company might be willing
to pay, for example, $7,000 in a case with an estimated settlement value of $100,000; in exchange the
funder would have a right to receive some specified amount – often computed as a percentage of the
claimant’s recovery – as a premium, along with recovery of the amount invested. Based on Avraham
& Sebok’s findings, the plaintiff in this hypothetical would owe the funder $16,000. Assuming the
case settled for its expected value, the plaintiff’s $100,000 recovery would be reduced by $33,000
owed to the lawyer (assuming a standard contingent-fee arrangement), some amount for costs, and
$16,000 due to the funder.
42. This is the effect of litigation financing. The motivation of investors may simply be to make
money. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 593, 595 (2012). But this is no criticism of litigation funding. Proponents of the free
market never tire of quoting Adam Smith’s observation that “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own selfinterest.” See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS Bk. 1, Ch. 2 (1776).
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as well as paying the hard costs of litigation. Because the firm receives
nothing if the client does not obtain a recovery, contingent-fee cases are
quite risky. Individual lawyers can generally advance the cost of modestsized contingent-fee cases—for example, the typical premises liability or
intersection collision case that is the bread and butter for personal-injury
lawyers across the country. Larger scale or riskier cases, however,
demand considerably higher capital reserves and risk tolerance. Many sole
practitioners and small firms cannot take on sophisticated tort cases, such
as medical malpractice and products liability matters, which require a
considerable outlay for experts and other expenses, or large, discoveryintensive cases like the breach of trade secrets lawsuit in Scenario #1,
above. The clients of these firms are often startup or small companies who
cannot afford to fund litigation out of their current working capital. 43
The two scenarios are really two sides of the same coin: many clients
with meritorious claims cannot afford to compensate law firms on an
hourly basis, and the types of firms that handle contingent-fee matters are,
for the most part, unwilling or unable to take on complex tort and
commercial matters. The result is systematic under-litigation of certain
types of claims and, correspondingly, systematic under-deterrence of
wrongdoing. One does not have to be too cynical to believe that the large
manufacturer may have considered the small company’s trade secrets to
be easy pickings. Protecting its intellectual property would require capital
that the small company did not have, and it would be unlikely to find a
firm that was prepared to handle the case for a contingent fee. Even more
cynically, perhaps the large competitor knew that, even if it eventually
lost the trade secrets lawsuit, protracted litigation would force the small
company to pay out of pocket, tying up a significant amount of its current
working capital in payments to lawyers. During the time the lawsuit was
pending, the small company would not be using its capital to innovate and
compete more effectively against the large manufacturer. Litigation
financing thus offers litigants the opportunity to make more productive
use of their working capital, rather than dissipating it on the expenses of
litigation. Law firms could offer this service, too, by taking cases on a
contingency-fee basis, but as Scenario #2 shows, there are often intra-firm

43. See, e.g., Paul Barrett, The Business of Litigation Finance Is Booming, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (May 30, 2017) (reporting on six-lawyer litigation boutique which can afford to take
on its contingent-fee cases only with the assistance of a third-party litigation financing firm). Even
where a client has the financial resources to fund litigation, for accounting reasons it may prefer to
remove litigation budgets from current expenses, thus improving reported cash flow. See David R.
Glickman, Note, Embracing Third-Party Litigation Finance, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1043, 1048-49
(2016).
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structural and governance barriers to law firms making increased use of
contingency fees.
Normatively speaking, what is important is that third-party financing
helps mitigate the impact of the parties’ disparity in resources on the
resolution of litigation. 44 It is well-established in the theory of tort liability
that the costs of administering a liability rule may have an impact on its
efficiency. 45 Simplified to its essence, the welfarist (or consequentialist,
or utility-maximizing) case for fault-based liability is that an actor will
compare the expected accident cost savings with the cost of taking a
precaution or adopting a new safety feature aimed at mitigating a
particular type of risk. 46 This comparison is expressed in the famous
B<PL formula from Judge Learned Hand’s Carroll Towing opinion. 47 A
rational, risk-neutral, utility-maximizing actor will take additional
precautions up to the point at which the cost of the precaution equals the
expected accident cost savings. 48 Going beyond this level will result in
socially wasteful over-spending on safety; better for society as a whole
that potential victims take their own precautions to protect themselves, or
that they simply “lump it” and self-insure against expected losses. This
assumes, however, that error and administrative costs can be ignored. As
Richard Epstein rightly points out, “[t]he dollars spent on judgment or
settlement will be incurred only in the fraction of cases in which the D is
sued and found liable.” 49 The ex ante application of the negligence
standard by actors potentially subject to liability depends on their ability
to make an accurate forecast of the “L” term in the Hand formula. The
error and administrative costs associated with a fault-based regime of
liability is sometimes taken as a consideration in favor of strict liability.50
Famously, Justice Traynor’s concurrence in the Escola case appeals to the
difficulty injured plaintiffs may have in proving the negligence of a
44. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (“In truth, . . . settlement
is also a function of the resources available to each party to finance the litigation, and those resources
are frequently distributed unequally.”).
45. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 64-69 (1987); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 250-53 (1970).
46. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 86, 99-106
(2002); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 300-11 (2d ed. 2000).
47. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
48. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE. L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972) (“Assuming injurers had the requisite foresight, [the Learned Hand test]
would cause potential injurers to avoid all accidents worth avoiding, i.e., those where avoidance costs
less than the accident, and to have only those accidents not worth avoiding.”).
49. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 4.9, at 98 (1999).
50. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 49; Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
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manufacturer of defective products. 51 The argument need not be taken as
far as that, however. The significance of the comparison with strict
liability is that even market-oriented law-and-economic accounts of the
public policy underlying the imposition of civil liability have to be
concerned with the possibility that repeat-player defendants do not receive
the right liability signals due to under-litigation of certain types of claims.
Back to the cynical interpretation of the large manufacturer’s
conduct in Scenario #1, an actor can also avoid the imposition of damages
by driving up the cost of litigation for any prospective adversary. The
deterrent impact of social cost internalization is therefore undercut by the
actions of a party subject to liability which has the effect of driving down
the imposition of damages. Imagine a stark, unrealistic hypothetical world
in which a party is frequently sued but is able to avoid liability through
some manipulation of the process. Suppose a taxicab company in an
exaggeratedly corrupt city has managed to pay off all the judges in the
local superior court so that every case brought against the taxicab
company will be dismissed on some ground—entirely fanciful if
necessary. The result would obviously be a greatly diminished deterrent
effect of liability for negligence. The signal sent by the repeated
dismissals would be that the company need not worry about paying
damages for accidents caused by poorly maintained taxicabs or ill-trained
drivers. The comparison is not meant to imply that all vigorous litigation
is equivalent to corruption of the judiciary. Rather, it is only to show that
factors exogenous to the legal and factual merits of a lawsuit may affect
the deterrent signal sent by judgments of liability or non-liability.
Civil liability serves functions other than deterrence, including
compensating injured victims, requiring the wrongdoer to rectify losses it
caused, 52 providing a substitute for cruder informal means of obtaining
redress, 53 sending a social message of condemnation, 54 and so on.
Whether one aims to provide an interpretive or functional account of the
law, 55 it is impossible to dispense with the idea of the legal merits of a
plaintiff’s claim. The idea of legal merit is clearest when thinking about
the deterrent function of liability. A meritorious claim is represented in

51.
52.

Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections on Method,
in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 183, 185 (Gerald J. Postema, ed. 2001).
53. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917 (2010).
54. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort
Law, 10 J. TORT L. 1 (2017).
55. See Emily Sherwin, Interpreting Tort Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 227 (2011).
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the Hand formula as the “L” term, the magnitude of the loss. The
defendant is expected to forecast accurately the probability (“P”) of losses
of various magnitudes and use that estimate to make a rational decision
whether to incur a burdensome (“B”) safety precaution to prevent the
harm. With sufficient information and in the absence of transaction costs,
the result is optimal deterrence. If one prefers a corrective-justice, civilrecourse, or expressivist account of civil liability, however, the legal merit
of the plaintiff’s claim is still critical to the analysis. (Note that I am not
equating all types of civil liability as necessarily involving wrongs; it may
be, for example, that contract law permits a party to breach and pay
damages as a kind of tax or penalty, but not be deemed a wrongdoer. 56)
Whatever the theoretical foundation of a system of legal norms imposing
liability, a necessary presupposition is that it matters to the functioning of
the system that claims be accurately adjudicated and that defendants pay
damages only when they ought to, according to applicable liability rules.
The best case for litigation financing, therefore, is that whatever the
underlying substantive law is designed to do, providing financial support
to the claimholder makes it more likely that the matter will be resolved on
its merits.
Leaving aside the actual, subjective motivations of the funders, the
Hulk Hogan and Uruguay cases may be defensible in these terms, as
making it more likely that disputes involving public values are decided on
their merits. The Hulk Hogan case raises an important issue in privacy
law. Tort law in most states recognizes a right of recovery for public
disclosure of private facts, protecting one’s right to be free from
embarrassing public dissemination of facts about one’s private affairs. 57
At the same time, however, the First Amendment protects the publication
of information that is not false and defamatory, as long as it pertains to
matters of public interest. 58 People have to endure sometimes truly awful
conduct, which otherwise would give rise to a cause of action for invasion
of privacy, if the expressive conduct involved is related to an issue of
public concern; consider, for example, the Westboro Baptist Church
protests of military funerals, which the Supreme Court held protected by
the First Amendment against claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 59 The question, as a Florida appellate court put it, is therefore
56. See, e.g., Curtis Bridgeman, Civil Recourse or Civil Powers?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
(2011).
57. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
58. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Gates
v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
59. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
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whether every aspect of a celebrity’s private life is a matter of public
concern. 60 Hulk Hogan made a career by seeking out publicity, but must
he endure the publication of a recording of him having sex with his best
friend’s wife? Peter Thiel’s interest in the case, whether as a personal
vendetta against Gawker or as a more public-spirited effort to protect
some modicum of privacy for people in the public eye, is in principle
separable from the merits of the underlying case. (Thiel referred to
funding the litigation against Gawker as “one of my greater philanthropic
things that I’ve done.” 61) Similarly, the Uruguay anti-smoking regulations
raised an important issue for the international law of investor-state
relations. The extent of a state’s police power in light of investment
treaties protecting intellectual property and requiring fair treatment is a
question that can be expected to recur. It is possible again to separate the
merits of Philip Morris’s challenge to the tobacco-control regulations
from the motivations of the Bloomberg-financed NGO that provided
assistance in defending the regulations.
One could take the position, which I think is fairly attractive, that as
long as the underlying action has merit, there is nothing more to be said
about the propriety of a third-party providing financial assistance to a
litigant. This stance would apply to either disinterested or interested
litigation financing. The funded parties in both the Hulk Hogan and the
anti-smoking cases prevailed, so from the point of view of fair resolution
of lawsuits on their merits, the impact of litigation financing appears to be
neutral or even positive. As discussed below, in connection with the law
of champerty, there is substantial precedent in some states supporting this
position. Here, however, I want to consider whether one factor in our
approval or disapproval of third-party financial support is the interests and
motivations of the financier. Do we feel favorably or unfavorably toward
someone like Peter Thiel or the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids with a
personal or ideological stake in the issue? Or is it better if a funder has no
horse in the race, beyond the desire to earn a reasonable return on an
investment?
III. INTERESTED LITIGATION FINANCING AND THE CONTROL CRITIQUE
These questions are often raised indirectly through insistence on a
core value of legal ethics, namely the independent professional judgment
of lawyers. Seen in this way, the question can be asked whether a greater

60.
61.

Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So.3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
See Sorkin, supra note 16.
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threat to independence is the purely financially motivated investment in
the small company’s trade-secrets case, in the hypothetical above, as
compared with Peter Thiel’s very public attempt to take down Gawker. In
turn, the answer may depend on deeper underlying beliefs about the
function of the civil justice system. Does it matter whether we think of the
litigation process as an arena for citizen participation in political debate?
The Supreme Court’s NAACP v. Button case, 62 and the widespread
practice of interest groups on the right and left funding “cause” or
“impact” litigation, 63 support a conception of litigation as a political
process. It has long been understood, however, that the motivations of the
funder may diverge from those of the litigants, and this may create tricky
crosscurrents, and even conflicts of interest, for the lawyers involved.64
Representing a claimant funded by a purely passive investor, which has
contractually undertaken not to involve itself in decision-making related
to the litigation, may be less of a headache for a lawyer. The following
section takes up these questions, beginning with the criticism of thirdparty financing as interfering with the independence of lawyers, and
proceeding through the sometimes arcane law of champerty and
maintenance.
Business-oriented groups, many of whom are also active in the tortreform movement, have spearheaded the opposition to commercial
litigation financing. 65 The Institute for Legal Reform, a project of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, has vociferously argued that litigation financing
should be subject to onerous regulations clearly designed to hobble or kill
off the industry. 66 It argues that litigation financing increases the rate of
62.
63.

371 U.S. 415 (1963).
See, e.g., ANN SOUTHWORTH: LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994); MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
64. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
65. Different criticisms, most emphasizing consumer-protection concerns, have been raised in
connection with consumer litigation financing. For example, the calculation of the return due to the
funder is so complicated that even a fairly mathematically savvy consumer would have trouble
determining the cost of the funds received. See Avraham & Sebok, supra note 32. In the commercial
sector, where sophisticated parties haggle over the terms of the investment, opacity of contract terms
is not an issue.
66. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE OF
LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION (2012)
[hereinafter, “STOPPING THE SALE”]. Specifically, the Chamber argues for the establishment of a new
federal agency, within the Federal Trade Commission, to regulate litigation financing. See id. at 10.
You read that right—the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is advocating for the creation of a new federal
regulatory agency. Note, too, that the subtitle of the report talks about a proposal to regulate third-
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frivolous litigation, 67 which itself is practically a frivolous claim, since no
rational investor would make a non-recourse investment in a claim that
was unlikely to result in a recovery. 68 (Hulk Hogan’s claim against
Gawker was far from frivolous; it resulted in a damages claim so large
that it drove the defendant into bankruptcy.) But the Chamber also claims
to be concerned with the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. It
argues that the presence of third-party financing will inevitably affect
decision-making by the claimant and its counsel:
As an investor in the plaintiff’s lawsuit, the TPLF [third-party litigation
financing] company presumably will seek to protect its investment, and
can be expected to try to exert control over the plaintiff’s strategic
decisions. The plaintiff’s lawyer, as the person being paid by – and
possibly even retained by – the investor, may accede to those efforts.
Even when the TPLF provider’s efforts to control a plaintiff’s case are
not overt, the existence of TPLF funding naturally subordinates the
plaintiff’s own interests in the resolution of the litigation to the interests
of the TPLF investor. 69

There is a lot going on in this passage. First is an assumption that the
financing company’s efforts to protect its investment will not come
through case selection and due diligence, but must take the form of
attempting to control strategic decision-making. Second is that funders
will seek to exercise overt control over the plaintiff’s case. Third is a tacit
premise that litigation financing is different from bank lending and
liability insurance in the extent of control exercised by the financier; in
reality, it may be that conventional financing agreements with commercial
banks include covenants that permit the lender to exercise a significant
degree of control over the law firm’s operations. 70 And fourth, that there
is something about the structure of litigation financing transactions that
inevitably subordinates the plaintiff’s interests to those of the investor. All
of those assertions turn out to be unsupported by the practices of the
litigation financing community, but focus for now on the second claim,
that a funder will attempt to control the conduct of the litigation by the
plaintiff’s law firm. In fact, litigation financing contracts are quite careful

party litigation financing, but the main title more frankly states the goal as stopping third-party
investment in lawsuits.
67. Id. at 4.
68. As the Texas Court of Civil Appeals recognized, “An investor would be unlikely to invest
funds in a frivolous lawsuit, when its only chance of recovery is contingent upon the success of the
lawsuit.” Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 105 (Tex. App. 1st 2006).
69. STOPPING THE SALE, supra note 67, at 4-5.
70. See Anthony J. Sebok, Selling Attorney’s Fees, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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to disclaim expressly and unequivocally any right to interfere with
counsel’s handling of litigation. 71 Given the Chamber’s seemingly
plausible assertion that an investor would want to exercise control over
the handling of litigation, it is worth exploring some of the reasons that
this in fact is not done.
The first reason is that the Chamber apparently does not think very
highly of the commitment of lawyers to comply with their ethical
obligations. A fundamental, foundational principle of legal ethics is the
independence of lawyers from control or influence, overt or subtle, by
other clients, payors or guarantors of legal fees, personal interests, or third
parties. 72 This principle is embodied in the concurrent conflicts rule, 73
various provisions of the rule prohibiting personal-interest conflicts, 74 and
an overarching requirement that lawyers exercise independent
professional judgment in the representation of clients. 75 Considering the
permissibility of the involvement of a third-party financing company in
the representation of a client, the New York City Bar Association
emphasized the lawyer’s duty of independence, “[w]hile a client may
agree to permit a financing company to direct the strategy or other aspects
of a lawsuit, absent client consent, a lawyer may not permit the company
to influence his or her professional judgment in determining the course or
strategy of the litigation . . .” 76
As Stephen Gillers has argued—also in a Miller-Becker Lecture—
there are numerous opportunities for third parties to interfere in the
lawyer-client relationship, yet we tolerate the risk of interference because

71. See, e.g., Charge Injection Techs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 2016 WL
937400, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016); Miller U.K., Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F.Supp.3d 711, 740
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (in camera review of financing agreement shows no assertion of control over the case
or settlement by the funder).
72. See Green, supra note 2.
73. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
74. Id. at r. 1.8(a) (business transactions with clients), 1.8(d) (acquiring media rights in the
subject matter of a representation), 1.8(f) (allowing third party payor of fees to interfere with the
lawyer’s independent judgment).
75. Id. at r. 2.1.
76. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011). A recent New York State
Bar ethics opinion warned that lawyers may not be on both sides of a litigation financing transaction,
again for reasons related to professional independence. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics. Op. 1145 (2018). The State Bar’s focus on independence is appropriate, but the committee
makes a significant mistake in its analysis when it states that a litigation financing transaction gives
the investor (whether a lawyer or non-lawyer) a proprietary interest in the subject matter of the
litigation. See id. ¶¶ 14, 18 (citing N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 1.8(i)). That is incorrect.
Litigation financing transactions create a contingent property right in the proceeds of the litigation,
which is distinct (as a matter of commercial law) from a right in the cause of action itself. See Sebok,
supra note 71.
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we believe lawyers have sufficient fortitude to stay focused on the
fiduciary obligations they owe to clients. 77 Insurers, banks, and officers of
corporate clients may seek to influence the way a lawyer carries out the
representation of a client. These situations can be tricky to navigate, and
the existence of triangular relationships between lawyers, clients, and
non-clients to whom some duties are owed (like liability insurers) create
some of the knottiest problems in professional responsibility doctrine. 78
Lawyers do handle these situations all the time, however, as part of their
commitment to fulfilling their duties of loyalty, competence, and
independent judgment that are owed to clients.
The second reason to think the Chamber’s concerns about
interference with the attorney-client relationship are overblown relates to
the old common-law doctrines of maintenance and champerty. Allowing
interference by a third party may subject the lawyer to tort liability for
champerty or may result in the investment agreement being invalidated as
contrary to public policy. 79 A lawyer wishing to avoid these consequences
will be extremely careful not to intrude into the decision-making process
involving the claimant and its counsel. For example, the purchase of a
claim was held not to constitute champerty where the purchaser did not
have the purpose of stirring up strife and did not acquire any “control,
input, influence, right or involvement of any kind” in the conduct of the
litigation. 80 Similarly, in a vigorously litigated Delaware case, the trial
court held that a third-party financing agreement did not constitute
77. See Gillers, supra note 32, at 680-82
78. The late Professor Hazard’s article on triangular relationships is one of the classics in the
field. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987). The most familiar “triangle” problem is that created by a lawyer’s duty
to an insured client and either a dual client relationship with the insurer or the position that the insured
is the lawyer’s sole formal client but some professional duties are nevertheless owed to the insurer.
See, e.g., Ellen Smith Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part
II – Contested Coverage Cases, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 29 (2001); Ellen Smith Pryor & Charles
Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities: Part I – Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 599 (2000); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Contracts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles
to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997); Thomas D. Morgan, What Insurance Scholars Should
Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in
the Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996); Charles Silver
& Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255
(1995); Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1583 (1994); Robert O’Malley, Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and
Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1991).
79. See, e.g., Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana, L.P., 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (“A champertous
agreement is unlawful and void where the rule of champerty is recognized, and the tainted agreement
is unenforceable,” although the doctrine is no longer recognized in South Carolina); see also Del
Webb Communities, Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2011).
80. Odell v. Legal Bucks LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 774 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
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champerty or maintenance because the funder did not have the contractual
right to control the litigation, nor did it have de facto control over the
conduct by counsel of the litigation. 81 The Chamber apparently fails to
appreciate that prohibitions on champerty and maintenance have had their
desired effect, and have prevented the assertion by third-party litigation
funders of rights to control litigation.
Champerty and maintenance may be unfamiliar to many lawyers. In
the ancient world, the intervention in disputes by strangers was viewed
with great suspicion. 82 The parties themselves, personal friends, and the
court were the only people who had any business being involved with
disputes. English common law picked up from classical sources the
mistrust of disinterested parties and blended it with a general attitude of
aversion toward litigation. The result was prohibitions on certain forms of
assistance to litigants by third parties. Blackstone defined the public
wrong of maintenance as “intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to
one.” 83 The prohibition was really aimed, however, at wealthy men who
bought an interest in a lawsuit over land, hoping to obtain a share of a
landed estate as part of the recovery in the lawsuit; combined with
medieval abhorrence of usury and speculation, the prospect of men with
capital but no land elbowing their way into the properties classes accounts
for much of the force of the common law prohibition on maintenance and
champerty. 84 In modern times, maintenance is defined as “officious
intermeddling in a suit which in no way belongs to the intermeddler,
by. . . assisting either party to the action, with money or otherwise,
to prosecute or defend it.” 85 Champerty is a subset of maintenance –
81. Charge Injection Techs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 2016 WL 937400, at *5
(Del. Super. 2016).
82. See the classic and fascinating historical account in Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48 (1935).
83. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
84. Radin, supra note 83, at 60-61; see also Charge Injection Techs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 2016 WL 937400, at *2 (Del. Super. 2016). The Delaware court gave a helpful
concise history of these doctrines: “The common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance
originated in Medieval England in response to the practice of feudal lords and other wealthy
individuals financing other individuals’ legal claims, usually against the financier’s political or
personal enemies, in exchange for a share of the results. These ‘champertors’ enlisted paid retainers
– known as ‘maintainers’ – who would prosecute the suits ruthlessly on the champertors’ behalf. Such
claims often involved title to land, which meant that the champertor would grow richer by becoming
a joint owner of the landed estate.”
85. Charge Injection Techs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 2016 WL 937400, at *3
(Del. Super. 2016); Kraft v. Mason, 668 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996); Giambattista v. Nat’l
Bank of Com., 586 P.2d 1180, 1187 (Wash. App. 1978). See also ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-12 (defining
maintenance as “officiously intermeddl[ing] in an action that in no way belongs to or concerns that
person, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 1

24

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[52:1

“maintaining a suit [i.e. providing financial assistance] in return for a
financial interest in the outcome.” 86 Or, as the leading modern academic
treatment of these doctrines defines them: “[C]hamperty occurs when the
intermeddler provides something of value to a party in a lawsuit in return
for a portion of the recovery.” 87
Readers in Ohio will be better acquainted than most with
maintenance and champerty, because it was an Ohio Supreme Court
decision that rather abruptly dusted off these doctrines and returned them
to the concern of practicing lawyers in the Rancman case. 88 The plaintiff
in a lawsuit against an insurance company sought to monetize the value
of her claim against the defendant, so she obtained advances totaling
$7,000 from two funding companies. When her case settled, she refused
to pay the amounts owed to the funding companies and initiated an action
seeking to rescind the transactions. At trial, the magistrate found that the
transactions were loans and the returns due the funders violated state
usury limitations. On appeal, the funding companies argued that the
transactions were investments, not loans, but the Ohio Supreme Court
took the case in a wholly unexpected direction by finding that the
financing contracts were void as champerty and maintenance. The court
had some unkind things to say about these practices, quoting a case from
1823 stating that maintenance “is an offense against public justice, as it
keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the
law into an engine of oppression.” 89 Not only that, said the court, but the
financing contracts created a disincentive for the plaintiff to settle the case
against the insurance company. The first advance of $6,000 gave the
funding company the right to the first $16,800 in proceeds. If the plaintiff
had a 30% contingency fee agreement with her attorney, she would
accordingly have an absolute disincentive to settle for anything less than
$24,000, because she would keep the $6,000 advance if there were no
judgment or settlement in her favor. For any settlement offer, the court
reasoned, the plaintiff would require a premium of $18,000 in order to
settle. This adverse incentive “can prolong litigation and reduce
settlement incentives—an evil that prohibitions against maintenance seek
action, with a view to promote litigation”).
86. Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana, L.P., 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)). See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.13, at 48990 (1986) (“Champerty is simply a specialized form of maintenance in which the person assisting
another’s litigation becomes an interested investor because of a promise by the assisted person to
repay the investor with a share of any recovery.”).
87. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98 (2011).
88. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
89. Id. at 220 (quoting Key v. Vattier (1823), 1 Ohio 132, 136).
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to eliminate.” 90 Although the Ohio legislature quickly overruled the
Rancman decision by passing a statute permitting consumer litigation
financing, 91 the case remains important and influential. In particular, the
argument that a transaction is prohibited as champerty and maintenance if
and to the extent that it creates a disincentive to settle remains helpful as
an analytical tool.
The concern about interference with the settlement incentives of the
parties reappeared in a more recent champerty case, arising in Illinois but
applying Minnesota law. 92 Like Rancman, the case arose out of a
consumer litigation funding transaction, which in substance was the
purchase of a share of the proceeds of the recovery in a wrongful death
lawsuit. (The court incorrectly refers to the transaction as a loan, 93 and at
one point lists usurious interest rates among the mischief targeted by the
prohibition on champerty. 94) When the plaintiff in the underlying action
refused to pay the funder pursuant to its contract, the funder sued her and
obtained a default judgment. Finding that judgment uncollectable, the
funder then sued the lawyer who had represented the plaintiff in the tort
litigation. The plaintiff had issued a letter of direction to her lawyer, which
he signed to acknowledge, instructing him to hold the proceeds of the
lawsuit in his trust account, but the lawyer instead had disbursed the funds
to the plaintiff. 95 But the lawyer paid over the funds to the client,
apparently believing the agreement (which he had a hand in negotiating)
was unenforceable. In agreeing with the lawyer that the agreement was
unenforceable because it constituted champerty, the court offered very
little analysis. The Minnesota case it cited, however, considered the
apparent national trend toward abolishing champerty and maintenance,

90. Id. at 221.
91. Ohio Rev. Code § 1349.55 (“Non-Recourse Civil Litigation Advance Contracts”).
92. See Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC v. Saulter, 2018 IL App (1st) 171277, 2018 WL
1364716 (Ill. Ct. App., March 13, 2018).
93. Id. at ¶ 8, 2018 WL 1364716, at *2 (referring, incoherently, to “a purchase agreement
detailing the terms of the loan”).
94. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 2018 WL 1364716, at *4-5.
95. Id. at ¶ 10, 2018 WL 1364716, at *2. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct include a
provision identical to that in the ABA Model Rules, which requires a lawyer to hold property in a
trust account if two or more persons claim an interest in that property. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, Rule 1.15(e). A concurring judge rightly pointed out that the lawyer had contractually
agreed to hold the proceeds in trust, and the funder in all likelihood would not have entered into the
transaction without this assurance. Prospect Funding, 2018 IL App (1st) 171277, at ¶ 41, 2018 WL
1364716, at *7 (Mason, J., concurring). After the dispute arose between the lawyer’s client and the
funder to whom the lawyer had given assurances, the proper course of action under Rule 1.15(e)
would have been to stay out of the dispute between the parties and leave the funds in the trust account
until that dispute was resolved.
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both as separate torts and as defenses to enforceability of a litigation
investment contract. 96 The highest court in states including
Massachusetts 97 and South Carolina 98 had concluded that goals such as
avoiding the filing of frivolous lawsuits or speculation by third parties in
lawsuits could be avoided using other doctrines and procedural devices,
so that champerty and maintenance had become a kind of fifth wheel on
the regulation of the civil litigation process. The Minnesota court,
however, relied on Rancman and cases from other states in concluding
that champerty and maintenance were not dead yet. The Illinois court
therefore held unenforceable the contractual assignment by the plaintiff to
the funding company of the proceeds of the litigation. 99
The Illinois court listed a number of ill effects on the litigation
system that justify the prohibition on champerty. They include (1)
encouraging people to sue, (2) giving control over the litigation to third
parties, (3) creating a disincentive to settle, (4) permitting strangers to
profit from the litigation of others, and (5) allowing a financier to make
an end-run around interest-rate caps provided by usury statutes. 100 None
of these arguments holds up to scrutiny. As for (1), the plaintiff had
already filed a wrongful death lawsuit; no “encouragement” was provided
by the funder. 101 Although it is not entirely clear from the opinion, many
consumer users of litigation financing services need short-term access to
capital while awaiting the conclusion of the litigation. As the concurring
judge notes, it may very well have been the case that financial exigencies
could have compelled the plaintiff to accept a lowball settlement offer.102
There is certainly nothing in the court’s opinion to suggest that the
plaintiff filed her lawsuit only after securing third-party financing.
Consideration (2) is purely speculation, and makes no sense given the
economics of consumer-sector litigation financing. Unlike commercial
funding, which occurs only after extensive due diligence and negotiations
with counsel for the claimant, most consumer funding transactions are
routinized and designed to minimize transaction costs. 103 Funders would
lose money if they engaged in extensive ex ante scrutiny of transactions,
so they use diversification strategies to lower their overall risk.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana L.P., 532 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 2000).
Prospect Funding, 2018 IL App (1st) 171277, at ¶ 29, 2018 WL 1364716, at *5.
Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 2018 WL 1364716, at *5.
Id. at ¶ 7, 2018 WL 1364716, at *2.
Id. at ¶ 41, 2018 WL 1364716, at *7 (Mason, J., concurring).
Avraham & Sebok, supra note 32.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss1/1

26

Wendel: Paying the Piper

2018]

PAYING THE PIPER

27

Monitoring ongoing cases and pestering claimants’ lawyers about tactics
and settlement decisions would drive up costs even further. Argument (3),
as the concurring judge points out, may be a feature and not a bug of
litigation financing. A plaintiff in a personal-injury action may have an
incentive to settle in order to obtain funds to pay medical and living
expenses; knowing this, a defendant may offer an amount lower than the
expected outcome at trial would warrant. 104 If the plaintiff’s ability to
monetize the future value of a judgment or settlement enables the plaintiff
to hold out for an amount closer to the actual expected value of her claim,
so much to the good. Factor (4) is hard to understand, given that lawyers,
liability insurers, court reporters, e-discovery vendors, and MercedesBenz dealers all “profit from the litigation of others”; something else must
be going on here. 105 It may be that there is something a bit creepy or offputting about valuing legal rights in monetary terms, but the court should
have recognized the irony that the underlying litigation was for wrongful
death. The plaintiff was already seeking to put a dollar value on the life of

104. See, e.g., Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the
Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11 (2014); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation
Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 72 (2010) (contending that
consumer litigation financing helps reduce the likelihood that a “risk-averse, one-time plaintiff may
dispose of a claim for too little because he is forced to sell to a repeat-player, risk-neutral defendant
that is in a much stronger bargaining position”). For example, a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case
against her employer reported that an advance on the value of her settlement helped her avoid having
her car repossessed and gave her the wherewithal to decline a lowball settlement offer. See Matthew
Goldstein & Silver-Greenberg, supra note 27.
105. The Rancman court said something similar: “[A] lawsuit is not an investment vehicle.
Speculating in lawsuits is prohibited by Ohio law. An intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the
fruits of litigation.” Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003).
Imagery of pollution and defilement is a theme in the history of prohibitions on champerty and
maintenance. The South Carolina Supreme Court, for example, said that “[t]he temple erected and
consecrated to Justice is not, however, to be polluted with impunity, by those who would prostitute
the rules regulating its police to base and unworthy purposes.” State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379,
399-401 (1830). I have written that the references to prostitutes or pigs gorging on fruit is a shorthand
way of making an argument that money is an inappropriate means of valuing some activity or good.
See W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (2014). See also ROBERT SKIDELSKY & EDWARD SKIDELSKY, HOW MUCH IS
ENOUGH? MONEY AND THE GOOD LIFE (2012); MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE
MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996);
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). One who objects to litigation
financing using metaphors of pollution and defilement is seeking to locate litigation within a nonmarket domain of value. But that ship has long since sailed, and the civil litigation system routinely
uses money as a rough approximation of the value of harms such as pain, suffering, and loss of
companionship and society. The law also permits other practices that tend to blur the line between
market and non-market modes of valuation, such as the purchase of life insurance policies from
terminally ill patients. See, e.g., Andy Rich, Viatical Settlements: The Visceral Reaction, the Existing
Market, and a Framework for Regulation, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 283 (2003).
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a loved one. Finally, argument (5) assumes the transactions are, in
substance, loans and not investments or purchases. The Supreme Court of
Colorado, interpreting that state’s Uniform Consumer Credit Act, has held
that consumer litigation financing transactions are subject to state usury
caps. 106 Whether the Colorado case is an outlier or rightly decided, it has
no application to the commercial-sector litigation financing cases that are
the subject of this Lecture.
Rancman and Prospect Funding are a bit unusual in taking a
categorical, highly formalistic approach to champerty. If there is literally
an agreement by a claimant and a third party, under which the third party
provides financial assistance in exchange for a financial interest in the
outcome of the lawsuit, there is champerty. The rules of professional
conduct governing lawyers had to define contingency fees by fiat as not
constituting champerty, although of course they do under the universally
accepted definition of champerty as providing assistance to a litigant in
exchange for a share of the outcome. 107 This stipulative definition of
contingent fees as non-champerty in the Model Rules shows that the
traditional elements of champerty sit uneasily, at best, with the realities of
modern litigation. Many states have abolished the doctrines of champerty
and maintenance,108 but in those that have not, courts do not use a literal
analysis, looking at whether a third-party received a financial benefit for
providing assistance in litigation. What factors are used by courts to
determine whether a transaction constitutes champerty tells us a great deal
not only about champerty and maintenance, but also about judicial
attitudes toward litigation and the way it is financed.
In New York, for example, champerty is defined as an investment
made for at least the primary purpose, if not the sole purpose, of bringing
suit. 109 A purchaser of distressed debt seeking to profit from the
transaction does not commit champerty just because it may need to resort

106. Oasis Legal Finance Group, LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015).
107. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 1.8(i)(2). Comment [16] to the rule
explains that it “has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid
giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation,” but that contingency fees are allowable
despite falling within the definition of champerty.
108. See, e.g., Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana L.P., 532 S.E.2d 269 (S.C. 2000); Saladini v. Righellis,
687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997). California never adopted the doctrines of champerty and maintenance.
See Martin v. Freeman, 216 Cal. App. 2d 639, 641-42, 31 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218 (1963). The Ninth
Circuit, applying Nevada law, has concluded that the consistent trend across the country has been to
limit the scope of the doctrines of champerty and maintenance. See Del Webb Communities, Inc. v.
Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011).
109. Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581, 586-87 (N.Y. 2000).
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to litigation in order to realize the value of its investment.110 As the Court
of Appeals subsequently clarified, there is a difference between acquiring
a right in order to make money on it, and acquiring a right in order to
enforce it. 111 An intent to sue on a claim does not transform a permissible
transaction into champerty. “[I]f a party acquires a debt instrument for the
purpose of enforcing it, that is not champerty simply because the party
intends to do so by litigation.” 112 A recent Court of Appeals decision
showed that the analysis really does turn on intent, and not something else,
such as the legal merit of the underlying claim. 113 In that case, one German
company wanted to sue another, claiming malfeasance in the management
of two investment vehicles. The would-be plaintiff was concerned,
however, that the German government would withdraw financial support
if it sued the other company, which was partly owned by the government.
The would-be plaintiff therefore worked out an arrangement with a third
party to act as stalking horse, and remit the proceeds to the would-be
plaintiff. 114 Because “there was no evidence, even following completion
of champerty-related discovery, that Justinian’s acquisition of the notes
was for any purpose other than the lawsuit it commenced almost
immediately after acquiring the notes,” 115 the court concluded that
summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate on the issue of
champerty.
On New York’s intent-based approach to champerty, both Peter
Thiel and the Bloomberg Foundation Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
would presumably be permitted to provide financial assistance to the
litigants in the underlying lawsuits. Both were completely uninterested in
making money. Thiel wanted to bring down Gawker, and the Bloomberg
group was seeking to help promote public health in the developing world.
This seems like an odd approach, however, if the purpose of champerty is
to protect the litigation system from the influence of non-parties. If a third
party is rich enough to be indifferent to the financial returns of litigation,
it can invest in a lawsuit, but a more ordinary financial institution,
concerned with making a reasonable profit, could potentially be excluded.
To put the point differently, if the purpose of prohibitions on champerty
and maintenance is to protect the litigation process from meddling by third

110. Id. at 588.
111. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortg. Inv’rs, Inc. v. Love Funding
Corp., 918 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 2009).
112. Id. at 894.
113. Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253 (N.Y. 2016).
114. Id. at 1254-55.
115. Id. at 1257.
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parties, it seems backwards to permit investment only by those third
parties with a non-pecuniary motive. In fairness to the Court of Appeals,
the three cases discussed above all deal with financial transactions, and
the court was likely not thinking about anything like the Hulk Hogan and
Uruguay cases. 116 Its approach in the 2009 case, emphasizing that a
financial investment for the purpose of enforcing the underlying right,
would be a better way to respect the policies underlying the doctrines of
champerty and maintenance.
Florida has a more straightforward, easier to apply test that better
tracks the relevant policies. It asks whether the financier instigated the
litigation or whether there was a preexisting lawsuit. 117 The case involved
an antitrust lawsuit being prosecuted by Kraft, who was running out of
money. He obtained a loan from his sister, Mason, for $100,000 in
exchange for specified shares of any amount recovered. Kraft repudiated
the contract after the antitrust case was settled for over $5 million, and
Mason sued for breach of contract. Kraft defended on the grounds that the
contract was void under the doctrine of champerty. The court first
discussed the doctrines of maintenance and champerty as they existed at
common law. But it then noted that the original doctrines had become
antiquated, and preferred the modern definition of champerty in which an
essential element is “officious intermeddling,” further defined as
“offering unnecessary and unwanted advice or services; meddlesome, esp.
in a highhanded or overbearing way.” 118 As an example of officious
intermeddling, the court cited a case in which a widow was persuaded by
a third party that a trustee of property was mishandling his management
of the property; the trustee was eventually exonerated and, when the
plaintiff sued the widow for payment for his services, the court concluded
that the contract was champertous.119 In the Kraft case, however, there
was no officious intermeddling because Mason, the sister/lender, did not
instigate the litigation and did not involve herself in the conduct of the
lawsuit. Significantly, she did not “concern herself with the antitrust
litigation or impose her views upon the attorneys or the litigants once she
provided the loan.” 120 She was a purely passive investor, just like a
commercial litigation financing firm.

116. A New York statute exempts transactions valued in excess of $500,000 from the definition
of champerty. See N.Y. JUD. L. § 489(2). Thus, even financially-motivated transactions that would
otherwise constitute champerty may fall within the statutory safe harbor.
117. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
118. Id. at 682.
119. See id. at 682-83 (citing Brown v. Dyrnes, 109 So.2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)).
120. Id. at 682.
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The Hulk Hogan case is a close call on the analysis in terms of
whether the funder, Thiel, was an officious intermeddler. There were
rumors that Hogan had turned down a substantial settlement offer because
Thiel wanted to go to trial and obtain an even larger award against
Gawker, with the aim of driving the company out of business. 121 If the
Florida test asks merely whether the lawsuit had already been commenced
before the funder became involved, then Thiel’s investment would not be
champerty. 122 In ordinary usage, however, it is hard to think of anyone
who is more of an officious intermeddler than Thiel. He admitted to
looking around for a lawsuit filed by a plaintiff with the financial
wherewithal to turn down reasonable settlement offers and take the case
to trial. Granted, he may have had some sympathy for Hogan, having
himself been victimized by the public disclosure of a private fact. From
his public statements, at least, Thiel appears much less interested in
making good law (from his point of view) on the relationship between
privacy torts and the First Amendment. If Thiel had done nothing other
than bankroll the litigation, however, there would be no argument that he
was an officious intermeddler, particularly in light of the fact that the
lawsuit had already been filed. Similarly, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids was in the position of passively investing in Uruguay’s defense of
its anti-smoking regulations, and was not an officious intermeddler.
IV. WHAT IS LITIGATION FOR?
In the classic article Against Settlement, Owen Fiss argued against a
purely private conception of litigation, in which the paradigm is a property
dispute between neighbors, and it is regrettable that they have been unable
to work out some kind of agreement among themselves. 123 Where courts
must be involved, it is a second-best solution to what is essentially a
problem of private ordering. The controversy arises between the parties,
and if after filing a bunch of pleadings and motions, reviewing documents,
and taking depositions, they are satisfied with an arrangement to resolve
the dispute, it is of no concern of courts. Except in certain types of cases,
including class actions, consent decrees, and litigation involving minor
121. See Salmon, supra note 14. Thiel said only that he had been looking for a plaintiff who
would not be tempted to accept a low settlement offer, presumably because the money was a matter
of indifference. See Sorkin, supra note 16. Presumably a wealthy celebrity like Hulk Hogan was the
perfect plaintiff from Thiel’s point of view.
122. See also Odell v. Legal Bucks LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (champerty
under North Carolina law requires that the purchaser of a claim act “with a purpose of stirring up
strife and continuing litigation”).
123. Fiss, supra note 45, at 1089.
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children, a settlement from the court’s point of view is accomplished by
the plaintiff filing a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the
action. The court does not decide on the reasonableness of the parties’
agreement. On a larger scale, law in general can be understood as a
second-best solution, where informal controls on behavior and
spontaneous ordering do much of the stabilizing work in society. 124 The
law performs a marginal or gap-filling role where individuals, the
dynamics of cooperative action, and decentralized norm-development
have failed to settle on an outcome. The law is superfluous in cases where
private ordering is sufficient.
On this conception of litigation, it is hard to see what could be wrong
with any third-party financial assistance to one of the parties. Even if the
financier insists on being quite intimately involved with the conduct of
litigation by the party and its lawyer, what could be the ground to object,
if what is at stake is of concern only to the parties themselves? Suppose
Owen and Robert are neighbors who are locked in a dispute about the
appropriate use of their property. Owen runs a candy factory, which
requires the use of a large industrial grinding machine; Robert is a
physician, who practices out of his house, which adjoins Owen’s
factory. 125 Robert would like Owen to confine the use of his machine to
hours in which Robert is not seeing patients; Owen would prefer the
freedom to conduct his candy-making operations at any time he pleases.
Every first-year law student learns, in Property or Torts, about an
influential view that the law ought to be involved only if the parties are
unable to bargain to a mutually agreeable solution, due to strategic
behavior or other transaction costs. 126 Owen may agree to pay Robert
$500 per month to compensate for the loss of revenue from seeing patients
during a specified time period during the day, but of course he need not
make that offer unless Robert has an entitlement to the “quiet enjoyment”
of his property and a damages remedy he can assert to force Owen to the
bargaining table. 127 The law and the legal process (including lawyers,
courts, the rules of procedure, and so on) are instrumentally valuable as a
way of dealing with the holdout problems and imperfect information that
might otherwise stand in the way of a mutually beneficial solution to the
problem created by Owen and Robert’s proximity to one another.
124. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
125. Based on the classic nuisance case, Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (C.A. 1879).
126. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 17-27 (3d
ed. 2003); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
127. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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Suppose the efficient outcome is that Owen continue to operate his
factory and pay Robert $500 in compensation. But suppose further that
Robert is single-mindedly dedicated to the practice of medicine and, while
finding the grinding noises annoying, is not particular motivated to pursue
negotiations or litigation against Owen. But Robert has a friend, Champ
R. Tee, who is a lawyer. Champ makes Robert an offer: “Sell me whatever
right you may have against Owen, I’ll bring the lawsuit, and we’ll split
the proceeds.” Leaving aside doctrines like standing, anti-assignment
rules, and of course champerty, what is wrong with this transaction, from
the normative point of view, if the value of law is entirely instrumental?
True, Robert would not have brought the lawsuit without the assistance of
Champ, but Robert’s entitlement existed in any event. Owen is no worse
off, with respect to the rights and duties he has under law, because Champ
has entered the picture. More to the point, if Owen, Robert, and Champ
are all satisfied with the outcome, in which Owen makes $500 monthly
payments, continues running his factory, and Champ receives $250 out of
Robert’s compensatory payments, then there is literally no standpoint
from which to criticize Champ’s involvement. Owen may be disappointed
that he now has to make the payments, but he never had a right not to.
Owen was receiving a windfall from Robert’s indifference to litigation,
but his loss of that windfall is not something about which he can
legitimately complain. Champ’s involvement may have increased the
transaction costs of bargaining, because he will want to ensure that his
half share of the proceeds is worth enough to justify spending time
pursuing the claim. Champ knows, however, that he cannot demand more
than the expected value of a judgment at trial. Perhaps Owen has reason
to worry that the judges or juries in the locality are capricious and likely
to award Robert more than he is entitled to. Even if that fear is justified,
however, the risk to Owen arises from the defect in the system, not from
Champ’s involvement.
Fiss—who as far as I know has no specific views on litigation
financing—would object to this way of characterizing the function of
litigation. He sees legal rights as not belonging only to the parties, but as
part of a public, political scheme of ordering that “belongs,” in a sense to
all of us: “Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using state
power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.” 128 Robert
and Owen clearly have an interest in resolving their conflict, but society
as a whole also has an interest in knowing what is regarded as a reasonable
use of land, in the context of surrounding uses. “An oft-forgotten virtue
128.
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of adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and application of
public values. In our rush to embrace alternatives to litigation, we must be
careful not to endanger what law has accomplished or to destroy this
important function of formal adjudication.” 129 One could take this too far,
of course, and standing doctrines limit the participation of truly
uninterested parties in litigation. But the critique of settlement, which
could be extended to the widespread use of arbitration agreements to
resolve claims involving issues of public importance such as workplace
discrimination, is that it impedes the ability of other citizens to learn about
the rights and duties that they have with regard to one another. From the
point of view of theoretical legal ethics, Daniel Markovits has argued for
an understanding of litigation as a kind of retail-level process of selfgovernment. 130 In order for the exercise of state power to be legitimate,
he contends, the subjects of legal authority must take ownership of
political outcomes. 131 Taking ownership comes only through an affective
engagement with the political process, which transforms citizens from
subjects to members of a democratic sovereign. 132 Most people participate
in the political process only in very indirect and attenuated ways, such as
by voting or donating to causes. Markovits claims, however, that litigation
offers an opportunity for citizens to become transformed through
participation in the process of “transforming brute demands into
assertions of right.” 133 The idea of “brute demands” in Markovits’s theory
corresponds with the private conception of litigation criticized by Fiss.
Indeed, Markovits sounds very much like Fiss when he writes that “[t]he
legal process does not achieve legitimacy by reaching settlements that
satisfy the aims that the participants bring to the process . . .” 134
Legitimacy requires transformation of private ends into assertions of
public rights.
Markovits’s emphasis on affective engagement and transformative
participation seems to suggest that third parties have no business meddling
in the lawsuits of others. If participation is a political value, however, there
seems to be no reason to limit the range of participants to the parties
formally joined by the pleadings. In Markovitsian terms, Peter Thiel

129. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668, 676 (1986).
130. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A
DEMOCRATIC AGE (2008).
131. Id. at 175-77.
132. Id. at 180.
133. Id. at 188-89.
134. Id. at 188.
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started out with a brute demand. He had a grudge against Gawker for
outing him, and wanted revenge. He was fortunate enough, however, to
be able to transform that brute demand into an assertion of right to privacy,
to establish as a principle of law that there are limits to the exposure and
humiliation that individuals must tolerate, even if they are in the public
eye. He brought that claim on behalf of Hulk Hogan, not himself, but if
participation and the establishment of public rights is the function of the
litigation system, it is hard to see why Thiel’s participation should not be
welcomed, or even encouraged. The same can be said of the Bloomberg
Foundation’s defense of the Uruguayan anti-tobacco regulations,
although that litigation necessarily expands the scope of citizenship and
sovereignty to international litigation. The Foundation, like many nongovernmental organizations, takes positions on matters of public
importance. Those positions may be nothing more than brute demands –
compare the usual critique of “special interests” – but they may also be
capable of transformation into assertions of rights. Markovits might
therefore cautiously approve interested litigation financing, while
remaining skeptical of participation by third parties who care about
nothing more than making a buck. The latter class of disinterested
financiers would, in Markovits’s terms, simply be seeking to profit from
a brute demand, which can be criticized in ethical terms with reference to
the function of the litigation system.
V. WHAT INTERESTED AND DISINTERESTED LITIGATION FINANCING
REVEALS ABOUT PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE
Section IV provided a functional account of the litigation system, but
the Lecture as a whole set out to focus on lawyers’ professional
independence, and the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. The
question is whether this functional analysis can be extended to explain and
justify features of the lawyer-client relationship, including professional
independence. Markovits makes an argument along these lines,
contending that in order to further the end of the participatory engagement
of their clients, lawyers must refrain from judging their clients’ causes and
allow them to participate in an unmediated way (providing only technical
expertise) in the litigation process. 135 In order to do this, a lawyer must
possess the virtue of negative capability. Negative capability means
effacing one’s own personal beliefs about the justice of the causes of one’s

135.
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clients, serving literally as a mouthpiece for clients’ positions.136 A lawyer
with this character trait is capable of “being in uncertainties . . . without
any irritable reaching after fact & reason” and “remaining content with
half knowledge.” 137 Negative capability is valuable because it enhances
the capacity of clients to participate in the process of transforming
“wholesale” political rights into the authoritative establishment of
“retail”-level legal entitlements that embody general principles as
concrete outcomes. 138 An ethical lawyer is thus literally a mouthpiece,
contributing nothing by way of restraint or critique to the positions
advanced by the client. This is a kind of fiduciary relationship, but a very
unusual and strong one, in which the duty of loyalty requires reducing the
distance between its subject and object as close to zero as is practical.139
Professional judgment, for Markovits, is therefore the antithesis of
ethical lawyering. It must be said that this is a radical view. Markovits
presents it as an alternative to the existing American law governing
lawyers, which he thinks licenses pervasive lying and cheating by
lawyers, 140 but he does not wish to eliminate lying and cheating from
litigation. Instead, he offers his ideal of negative capability as a
redescription of these vices as the virtue of adversarial advocacy. 141 On
this account, there is no room for professional independence. Lawyers are
a special type of fiduciary, however. Their duty of loyalty does not require
self-effacement or maximal identification with the client’s ends. Rather, a
lawyer must be able to represent the client with competence and diligence
within the bounds of the law. Critics excessive identification of lawyers
with their clients like to quote an aphorism from Elihu Root, who said that
“[a]bout half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be
clients they are damned fools and should stop.” 142 Lawyers do not need to

136. Id. at 93-94.
137. Id. at 94 (quoting John Keats, Markovits’ inspiration for the value of negative capability).
138. Id. at 184-86.
139. George Fletcher argues that this maximalist conception of loyalty—”thou shalt be one with
me”—is necessarily nonrational, based on deep emotional commitments. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
LOYALTY 61-62 (1993). Markovits does not attempt to ground the fiduciary duties of lawyers in
emotional attachments, but relies instead on considerations of personal integrity. See W. Bradley
Wendel, Methodology and Perspective in the Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics: A Response to Professors
Woolley and Markovits, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 1011 (2010).
140. MARKOVITS, supra note 131, at 34-35.
141. Id. at 162-69. Markovits has almost nothing to say about counseling clients on compliance
with the law or transactional representation. This is a flaw in the book as a whole, but not relevant to
its application here, since the core of Markovits’s conception of ethical lawyering pertains to
representing the parties in civil litigation.
142. GERALD W. GAWALT, THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA
4 (1984); 1 PHILLIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 132-33 (1938). Root also famously stated: “The client
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tell their clients that they are fools, but they must be able to assess when
their clients’ interests lie outside the boundaries of their entitlements
under applicable law. 143 In the language of the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, the lawyer’s fiduciary duty is to “proceed in a
manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives, as
defined by the client after consultation.” 144 The key concepts here are both
the client’s objectives (which Markovits relies upon exclusively) and their
lawfulness, the assessment of which requires some independent judgment
by lawyers. Lawyers are prohibited by both rules of professional conduct
and rules of civil procedure from pursuing a claim that is not sufficiently
well grounded in law and fact, including a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.145
Third-party litigation financing is believed to threaten the lawyer’s
ability to stay true to the course prescribed by the law governing lawyers.
With respect to disinterested financing, the concern would be that the
obligation to repay the funder may take precedence in the lawyer’s mind
over the pursuit of the client’s lawful objectives. This concern underlies
the prohibition on lawyers splitting their fees with non-lawyers. 146 The
fee-splitting rule, along with some states’ interpretations of champerty and
maintenance prohibitions, has led to a fairly strong norm among
commercial litigation financing companies of disclaiming any permission
to control the exercise of professional judgment by counsel for the
claimant whose case has been funded. 147 Commercial funders therefore
rely on case-selection and due-diligence procedures to protect the value
of their investment. 148 After the financing transaction closes, the company
never wants to be told he can’t do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the
lawyer’s business to tell him how.” ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS,
1819-1947, at 667 (1946). Given Root’s robber-baron clientele, it is likely that the second maxim is
more representative of his understanding of lawyer professionalism. Legal historian Lawrence
Friedman contends that lawyers always served first themselves, then their clients, and last “their
conception of that diffuse, nebulous thing, the public interest.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 639 (2d ed. 1985).
143. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (2000).
145. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 3.1; FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
146. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 5.4(a). See also W. Bradley Wendel,
(Feb.
27,
2018),
Making
Sense
of
the
Fee-Splitting
Rule,
JOTWELL
https://legalpro.jotwell.com/making-sense-fee-splitting-rule/
[https://perma.cc/TUL7-LXU2]
(reviewing Sebok, supra note 32).
147. See supra note 32.
148. See, e.g., Bentham IMF’s description of the funding process and the information
considered in due diligence. Funding Overview, BENTHAM IMF, https://www.benthamimf.com/
docs/default-source/default-document-library/bentham-funding-overview_20170822.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5W89-7FV2].
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is a purely passive investor. The claimant’s lawyer remains obligated by
common-law malpractice and fiduciary duty rules to pursue the client’s
objectives within the constraints of adequate foundation in law and fact.
Litigation financing is without recourse, meaning that if the litigation
yields no proceeds in the form of a judgment or settlement, neither the
claimant nor the lawyer has any obligation to repay the funder. The client
will have whatever motives and incentives it has with respect to recovery.
It may be willing to accept an early, low settlement offer, or it may want
to go to trial. That decision is for the client alone to make. 149 Underscoring
this division of authority, courts and ethics opinions prohibit any indirect
effort by lawyers to gain control over settlement decisions, such as
providing in the engagement agreement that a contingent fee will convert
to hourly if the client does not take the lawyer’s advice regarding
settlement. 150 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that there is no “ethical
dilemma” created by a defendant’s offer to settle a lawsuit where one of
the conditions is that the lawyer waive any statutory entitlement to fees:
[A] lawyer is under an ethical obligation to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of his client; he must not allow his own
interests, financial or otherwise, to influence his professional advice.
Accordingly, it is argued that a lawyer is required to evaluate a
settlement offer on the basis of his client’s interest, without considering
his own interest in obtaining a fee; upon recommending settlement, he
must abide by the client’s decision whether or not to accept the offer. 151

The point simply is that disinterested litigation financing does not provide
any additional pressure on the independence of lawyers, over and above
that which lawyers are already accustomed to dealing with.
Interested litigation funders, by contrast, may present a different type
of risk to professional independence. My own view is that lawyers’ ethical
commitments are, in most cases, robust enough to safeguard against this
risk, but it is nevertheless one which lawyers should take very seriously.
The Model Rules regulate the possibility that one who pays the piper may
149. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 1.2(a).
150. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT ¶ 31:1107; Morris Law
Office, P.C. v. Tatum, 388 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Va. 2005) (fee agreement unenforceable to the
extent it expands the right to compensation beyond quantum meruit in the event of discharge); Jones
v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), as modified on denial of reh’g
(Feb. 2, 1995), rev’d, 926 P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1996) (conversion of contingent to hourly fee arrangement
impermissible); N.Y. County Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 736 (2006) (contingent fee agreement may not
convert to hourly if client refuses “reasonable” settlement offer); Oregon Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 200554 (similar to NYCLA); Phila. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 2001-1 (similar); Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics Op. 95-24, at *2 (July 6, 1995) (similar).
151. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
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wish to call the tune. Rule 1.8(f) permits third-party payments of a
lawyer’s fee – as is common when a liability insurer or employer pays for
the defense of an insured or employee – but the lawyer is required to
ensure that there will be no interference with the lawyer’s professional
judgment as a result. 152 In the investor-state arbitration matter, for
example, lawyers representing Uruguay can accept payment from the
Bloomberg Foundation, as long as they are free to do whatever they
believe (in consultation with their client, of course) is in the best interests
of the state of Uruguay. If the Minister for Public Health, or other
government official supervising the law firm’s conduct of the litigation,
believes that a settlement that left in place only some of the proposed
regulations is in the best interests of the government, the lawyers must
accept their client’s instructions, even if the Bloomberg Foundation
believes it would be better for global public health if the Uruguayan
government had fought for other anti-smoking regulations. This is why
the rumors (and, so far, that is all they are) that Peter Thiel persuaded Hulk
Hogan’s lawyer to reject a reasonable settlement offer are disturbing.
Lawyers must respect their clients’ wishes regarding settlement.
However, if Thiel, Hogan, and Hogan’s lawyer had a three-way
conversation in which Thiel managed to persuade Hogan that it was in his
(Hogan’s) best interests to reject the settlement offer and proceed to trial,
there would be no violation of the rule requiring the lawyer to accept the
client’s decision regarding settlement. One may wonder, of course, how
much coercion might be present in that type of interaction, but Hogan’s
wealth, fame, and many years in the public eye probably equip him to
stand up to pressure from the funder of his lawsuit. From the point of view
of legal ethics it is, at least in principle, conceivable that a funder and a
claimant could agree among themselves that the claimant would take the
funder’s interests as his own, and instruct the lawyer to pursue them. 153
As discussed above, an arrangement of that sort may raise concerns under

152. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 1.8(f).
153. The Restatement’s equivalent to Model Rule 1.8(f) explicitly permits a client to delegate
to a third party the right to make decisions with respect to the litigation. The Restatement provides:
A lawyer’s professional conduct on behalf of a client may be directed by someone other
than the client if:
(a) the direction does not interfere with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment;
(b) the direction is reasonable in scope and character, such as by reflecting obligations
borne by the person directing the lawyer; and
(c) the client consents to the direction under the limitations and conditions provided in §
122.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134(2) (2000).
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champerty and maintenance doctrines, but would not threaten the
independence of the lawyer representing the claimant.
VI. LET THE SUNSHINE IN? MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF LITIGATION
FINANCING?
The primary focus of this Lecture is the attorney-client relationship
and the ethical duties owed by the lawyer to the client. Recently, however,
a spirited debate has emerged over the issue of disclosure of third-party
financing to the opposing party or the court. In January 2017, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California adopted, as a
provision of its Standing Order, a rule requiring disclosure of third-party
litigation financing arrangements, but only in class actions. 154 Later in the
same year, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure
considered a renewed proposal by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Institute for Legal Reform, to amend Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) to add a
new provision requiring mandatory disclosure of “any agreement under
which any person, other than an attorney permitted to charge a contingent
fee representing a party, has a right to receive compensation that is
contingent on, and sourced from, any proceeds of the civil action, by
settlement, judgment or otherwise.” 155 And in May 2018, three
Republican Senators introduced a bill called the Litigation Funding
Transparency Act of 2018, which would require disclosure of third-party
financing in class actions and multidistrict litigation.156
Proponents of mandatory disclosure make a simple and powerful
argument: Greater transparency is to be favored in litigation, because it
will enable judges to protect the system from abuse. Senator Charles
Grassley, one of the sponsors of the Senate bill, uses ominous language to

154. See Ben Hancock, Northern District, First in Nation, Mandates Disclosure of Third-Party
(Jan.
23,
2017),
Funding
in
Class
Actions,
RECORDER
https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202777487488/Northern-District-First-in-NationMandates-Disclosure-of-ThirdParty-Funding-in-Class-Actions/ [https://perma.cc/We67-2YS3].
155. See MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AGENDA BOOk,
Washington, D.C., November 7, 2017 [hereinafter “ADVISORY COMMITTEE AGENDA BOOK”],
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-civilprocedure-november-2017 [https://perma.cc/4PUU-JQ4M]. Materials on litigation financing are
behind Tab 7B, beginning on p. 343. As the Advisory Committee observes, the Chamber initially
made a proposal for mandatory disclosure of litigation financing in 2014. See id. at 345.
156. Litigation Funding Transparency Act of 2018, S. 2815, 115th Cong. sponsored by Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley and Senators Thom Tillis and John Cornyn, available
at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/115.xxx%20%20Litigation%20Funding%20Transparency%20Act%20of%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9WD5BYP].
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describe litigation financing as existing in the shadows and, hence,
dangerous:
For too long, obscure litigation funding agreements have secretly funneled money into our civil justice system, all for the purpose of profiting
off someone else’s case. The courts and opposing parties should know
whether there are undue pressures and secret agreements at play that
could unnecessarily drag out litigation or harm the interest of the claimants themselves. No one’s saying that litigation funding should be prohibited at this time. But a healthy dose of transparency is needed to ensure that these profiteers aren’t distorting our civil justice system. 157

Who can be opposed to a “healthy dose of transparency”? Grassley’s press
release also repeats familiar anti-commodification rhetoric, 158 labeling
litigation financing firms as “profiteers” who are seeking to make money
“off someone else’s case.” (It is always puzzling to hear Republican
lawmakers, who in many other ways are almost religiously committed to
the free market and capitalist values, muttering about “profiteering.”)
However, the primary thrust of the argument, and the bill itself, is
disclosure and transparency.
Transparency is not valuable for its own sake, but as a means to some
other end. The most obvious end is that which is also served by the
discovery rules – namely, obtaining information that will lead to
admissible evidence at trial. 159 But the ways the parties finance litigation
is peripheral to the claims and defenses they raise. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Advisory Committee’s notes on the 2017 proposed
amendment discuss other goals unrelated to the presentation of evidence
at trial. These include:
• Learning whether the plaintiff has the financial wherewithal
to decline reasonable settlement offers and unnecessarily
157. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Grassley, Tillis, Cornyn Introduce Bill to Shine Light on
Third Party Litigation Financing Agreements (May 10, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
press/rep/releases/grassley-tillis-cornyn-introduce-bill-to-shine-light-on-third-party-litigationfinancing-agreements [http://perma.cc/P2TL-SZX5].
158. See supra note 106 (summarizing scholarship on commodification). A spokesperson for
the Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform touts the proposal for “pull[ing] back the curtain on third
parties ‘gambling’ on the outcome of class action lawsuits and federal multi-district litigation, a
practice that turns our courtrooms into casinos and plaintiffs into little more than poker chips.” See
Amanda Bronstad, What Are People Saying About Senate’s New Lit Funding Bill?, NAT’L L.J. (May
14, 2018) (quoting Lisa Rickard). Whether the imagery of gambling, casinos, and poker chips is an
apt criticism of litigation financing turns on its social meaning which, as one may sometimes forget,
is contestable. Now familiar and uncontroversial financing practices such as life insurance and
exchange-traded futures contracts for agricultural commodities were once regarded as illicit
gambling. See Wendel, supra note 147, at 681 & n.111.
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).
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prolong litigation, 160 or whether the financial arrangement
between the funder and the plaintiff (e.g. the funder’s right
to return of first dollars from the proceeds of a settlement)
will have the effect of deterring settlement. 161
• Ascertaining the extent to which a funder exercises control
over matters such as settlement, disclosure of information
protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product
doctrine, and selection of counsel or expert witnesses. 162
• Uncovering potential attorney conflicts of interest or reasons
to doubt the adequacy of representation by class counsel. 163
• Supporting the ethical obligations of judges to recuse
themselves from participating in cases in which they have a
financial interest. 164
In response to these arguments, the Advisory Committee concluded, with
admirable candor, that it lacked information sufficient to make the
difficult judgments required to determine whether a rule amendment
would further the policies underlying the Rules of Civil Procedure. 165
The Advisory Committee is acting in a legislative capacity,
considering general rules to govern a wide range of situations. District
judges presiding over litigated matters have the advantage of a welldeveloped factual record bearing on the goals of disclosure. In two recent
cases, the court has concluded either that details of a third-party financing
arrangement are irrelevant to any of the goals described above, or that
these goals may be achieved by limited, carefully tailored disclosure.
One of those cases, Miller U.K., Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.,166 is the
inspiration for the David v. Goliath scenario in Section II.A. The large,
much better financed party in that case sought discovery from the smaller
party of the transactional documents executed by the small party and the
financing firm, as well as any information shared with the financier that
would otherwise be privileged or subject to work product protection. 167

160. ADVISORY COMMITTEE AGENDA BOOK, supra note 156, at 348.
161. Id. at 349.
162. Id. at 348-49, 353.
163. Id. at 351-52.
164. Id. at 352-53.
165. Id. at 346.
166. 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
167. The issue of waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection in the
context of litigation funding has been actively litigated. Because the analysis in this section pertains
to the value of transparency, it will focus on the first set of arguments in Miller, concerning the
relevance of the “deal documents,” and will not consider the waiver issues presented in the case. See
id. at 721.
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The claimed grounds for producing the transactional documents was to
give the court an opportunity to inquire into whether the financing
constituted prohibited champerty and maintenance, and thus would
provide a ground for voiding the contract, and whether the transaction
turned the financing firm into a real party in interest. 168
As for maintenance, the magistrate judge observed that a third-party
financer does not violate the Illinois statutory prohibition on maintenance
unless it is an “officious intermeddler” in the litigation. 169 As for what
constitutes officious intermeddling, recall that the distinction between
interested and disinterested funders turns on whether the funder has a nonfinancial interest in the outcome of the litigation. Under the approach
taken by Florida courts, a disinterested funder is, by definition, not an
officious intermeddler. 170 The magistrate judge in Miller took a different
approach to the definition of officious intermeddling, looking to whether
the funder had any role in “wickedly and willfully” stirring up the
litigation in the first place or fomenting baseless litigation solely for the
purpose of harassment. 171 Under Illinois law, the definition of
maintenance therefore turns not so much on the funder’s purpose, or
whether the funder shares the litigant’s ideology or goals in the litigation,
but whether the dispute would have occurred anyway, without the
institution of someone who is “engaged in exciting or stirring up any suit
or quarrel between the people of this state with a view to promote strife
or contention.” 172 Under either approach to officious intermeddling,
however, the further problem with the request for production of the deal
documents was that champerty and maintenance are irrelevant to the
trade-secrets issues in dispute in the litigation. 173 As the magistrate judge
rightly noted, if a court is concerned about stirring up meritless litigation
or needlessly prolonging lawsuits, there are other tools available that are
better suited to controlling these abuses. 174
The second argument in Miller might be raised in an effort by
Gawker to discover the fact that Peter Thiel is the financier behind Hulk
Hogan’s lawsuit, and thus dismiss the lawsuit for failure to prosecute it in
the name of the real party in interest. 175 A real party in interest is defined

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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Id. at 719.
Id. at 725.
Kraft v. Mason, 668 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 725-26.
Id. at 726 (quoting People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 135, 766 N.E.2d 641, 644 (2002)).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727-28.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
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as “the person holding the substantive right sought to be enforced, and not
necessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery.” 176
Most commercial litigation funding agreements include terms similar to
those in the agreement between the small company and the funder, under
which the funder has no legal interest of its own in the underlying
litigation, but merely provides funds to a party in exchange for a
contingent interest in a share of the proceeds of the litigation. After
reviewing the deal documents in camera, the magistrate judge in Miller
found that the funder was not analogous to an insurer or assignee, which
has its own interest to protect and (although this was not explicit), a right
to control the conduct of the litigation. 177 The logic of the Miller decision
may suggest that a funder acting as a true puppet master, pulling the
strings of a nominal party, could have its own right to protect in the
lawsuit. But it is important to keep the focus on the substantive right being
asserted in the litigation. 178 A trustee, subrogee, or third-party beneficiary
of a contract truly stands in the shoes of the nominal plaintiff’s rights.
Similarly, the assignee of a patent is a proper party who may sue for
infringement. 179 But Thiel has merely a rooting interest in the success of
the privacy action against Gawker. The media company never violated his
privacy rights. Interested litigation funders do not become real parties in
interest just because they attempt to exert some control over the conduct
of the litigation. They must have their own substantive right at stake in
order to be proper parties, and thus for discovery of their identity to be
appropriate. A fortiori the existence of a passive, disinterested funder is
not discoverable for the purpose of making an argument that the action
should be dismissed for failure to join a real party in interest.
The other district court order on disclosure is from a forum nearby to
the University of Akron. It arises out of the consolidated multidistrict
litigation (MDL) proceedings in the Northern District of Ohio in the
prescription opioid drug litigation. On May 7, 2018, U.S. District Judge
Dan Aaron Polster ordered that attorneys representing plaintiffs in the
MDL proceedings disclose to the court the identity of any third-party
funders, along with affidavits from both the financier and counsel stating
that the funding arrangement does not:
(1) create any conflict of interest for counsel, (2) undermine counsel’s

176. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 728 (quoting Farrell Constr. Co. v. Jefferson Par., La., 896 F.2d
136, 140 (5th Cir. 1990)).
177. Id. at 729.
178. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.3, at 340 (4th ed. 2005).
179. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
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obligation of vigorous advocacy, (3) affect counsel’s independent professional judgment, (4) give to the lender any control over litigation
strategy or settlement decisions, or (5) affect party control of settlement. 180

Significantly, the disclosure must be made in camera to the court, and the
court refused to allow discovery by opposing parties into litigation
financing. 181 While this order lacks the thorough reasoning of Miller, the
Ohio district court is in line with the Illinois district court in Miller in its
skepticism toward broad-brush arguments that litigation financing
threatens the integrity of the judicial system. The Ohio district court
instead focuses specifically on the impact on the professional duties of
lawyers representing the plaintiffs. Moreover, by ordering in camera
review of the documents, the court diminishes the incentive the
defendants might otherwise have to engage in discovery for the purpose
of harassing the plaintiffs and their counsel.
Defendants often assert in a broad, conclusory manner that thirdparty litigation financing tends to create conflicts of interest or give the
funder control over decision-making in the litigation. In the Ohio MDL
proceedings, the required in camera review ensures that these are not
merely speculative allegations. Presumably the parties obtaining funding,
and the funders, will use their affidavits to point out features of the
financing documents that protect the independence of counsel. The funder
may specifically disclaim any right to influence settlement or have a say
with respect to other decisions that must be made in the course of the
litigation. Beyond these sorts of representations and warranties, the
financial arrangement between the parties may be structured to minimize
conflicts of interest. For example, funders who are interested in protecting
the independence of the lawyers representing plaintiffs will avoid
including a provision in the financing agreement that provides an
incentive to settle early. 182 A funder may be entitled to notice of a
settlement offer, and the plaintiff’s may value the advice of an
experienced party who can give the terms of the offer a “second look,”
but the financing documents should not give the funder the right to
approve the settlement offer before it is accepted by the plaintiff. 183 This
180. See Order Regarding Third-Party Contingent Litigation Financing, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opioid Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2018 WL 2127807 (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2018).
181. Id.
182. See Steinitz & Field, supra note 10, at 737-38.
183. Id. at 741. Steinitz and Field argue that, as a normative matter, a funder should be permitted
to give value to the plaintiff in exchange for the right to exercise control over the litigation. See id. at
738. I am in complete agreement with this view, but also believe (along with the authors) that the
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limitation on control by the funder may inhibit interested third-party
financing, because a funder will seek to avoid an overt assertion of control
over the litigation. An interested third party may be limited to funding
claims by parties who share the funder’s non-financial goals and are
equally committed to realizing them.
One curiosity in the Ohio district court order is the judge’s warning
that “[t]he Court will deem unenforceable any [third-party contingent
litigation] financing agreements that are not compliant with this Order.” 184
Federal district courts, like any trial-level tribunal, have the inherent
authority to regulate the conduct of the parties and their counsel in
connection with pending litigation. 185 For example, a federal court may
regulate admission to its own bar and discipline attorneys practicing
before it, enforce standards of courtroom decorum, vacate its own
judgments upon proof of fraud and, in limited circumstances, award
attorneys’ fees as a sanction for bad faith, vexatious, or oppressive
conduct. 186 However, the court’s inherent power should not extend to
invalidating contracts between a party and a funder. As the district court
in Miller noted, court decisions invalidating litigation funding agreements
on the grounds of champerty and maintenance arose in connection with
an action to enforce the contract.187 It is doubtful that the Ohio court could
make good on its threat to invalidate a financing agreement for noncompliance with the court’s order, although it would still be an extremely
bad idea for the parties to provoke the judge’s wrath.
VII.CONCLUSION
The vast majority of litigation financing is purely profit-motivated;
in the terms used in this Lecture, it is disinterested financing. It presents
little danger to the fair and efficient functioning of the civil justice system.
In fact, disinterested financing promotes the interest in ensuring that
lawsuits are decided on their merits, without regard to the parties’
financial wherewithal. To the extent disinterested funding does present

safest course of action for the parties is to ensure that financing documents make clear that the funder
has no right to control decision-making, and particularly influence decisions regarding settlement. See
Sebok & Wendel, supra note 32, at 1839-40, 1856-57.
184. Order Regarding Third-Party Contingent Litigation Financing at *1, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opioid Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2018 WL 2127807 (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2018).
185. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
186. Id. at 43-46.
187. Miller, U.K., Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 125, 789 N.E.2d 217 (2003));
Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 681 (Minn. App. 2004).
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risks, they can be mitigated by existing rules of procedure, such as the
prohibition on bringing baseless lawsuits; by prohibitions on champerty
and maintenance, applied, as in New York and Florida, in a way that
respects the purposes of the doctrines; by narrowly tailored disclosure
orders, such as the one entered in the Northern District of Ohio MDL
proceeding; and by reliance on lawyers’ compliance with their ethical
obligation to protect their independent judgment. A more substantial risk
of interference is presented by interested funding, like Peter Thiel’s
participation in the Gawker litigation. Interested funding, however,
strongly resembles political participation by means such as donating to
repeat-player litigants like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Sierra
Club. As a form of political participation, interested funding can claim at
least prima facie protection by the First Amendment. It may be that
Thiel’s support of Hulk Hogan, and the support by the Bloomberg
Foundation of Uruguay’s defense of its anti-smoking regulations, ensured
that important public values were fully litigated. Opponents of litigation
financing, like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, often themselves are
interested funders, seeking to influence the outcome of litigation for
ideological reasons. The irony is that interested litigation financing
appears to present a greater danger to the litigation system than the
disinterested funding that is the usual target of the Chamber’s lobbying
efforts (which themselves, one should note, also represent an intervention
in the litigation system on behalf of large corporate defendants).
As for the professional independence of lawyers, which was the
major theme of this Lecture, it once again proves to be a rather protean
value. If independence is understood as independence from the interests
and demands of clients – enabling the lawyer to serve as an officer of the
court, ensuring that only claims with adequate legal and factual grounding
are pursued – then litigation financing is a matter of indifference. If the
ideal of independence is meant to reinforce the lawyer’s fiduciary
obligations to the client, and to buck up the lawyer to resist interference
by third parties, then litigation financing may be seen as a risk, but a
manageable one. The lawyer’s fiduciary duties can be quite demanding,
and often require the lawyer to act against her own financial interests. But
litigation financing is no different in this respect than the risks presented
by hourly and contingency fees, both of which create their own
characteristic misalignment of interests. Finally, if one takes the radical
position of Daniel Markovits with respect to professional independence,
the lawyer should see her client’s interests as only one view among many
to be promoted in a “retail” resolution of competing political principles.
An interested funder, like Thiel or the Bloomberg Foundation, has the
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same political rights as a client, if litigation is seen as serving an
essentially public function.
My own view is that professional independence should be
understood as an ideal related to the lawyer’s dual role as a fiduciary of
clients and as an officer of the court. A lawyer’s fundamental ethical
obligation is to pursue, on behalf of a client, those rights which are
allocated to the client by the legal system. 188 Of course, the scope and
content of the client’s entitlements are frequently contestable or uncertain,
and a lawyer representing a client in litigation is permitted to take a
partisan stance on behalf of the client. Nothing about third-party litigation
financing – either disinterested or interested – necessarily presents a risk
to lawyers’ compliance with this basic ethical obligation. If Hulk Hogan
agreed to have his lawsuit funded by Peter Thiel because of a shared
antipathy toward Gawker, his lawyer is not caught between two
incompatible positions regarding the conduct of the litigation. And if a
small company agrees to share some of the proceeds of a judgment or
settlement with a funder, because it believes that is the best way to
vindicate its rights against a much larger adversary, there is no threat to
the lawyer’s ability to act on behalf of that client. While one might
imagine a nightmare scenario in which a litigation funder calls the tune,
the actual cases that have arisen, including those involving interested
funders, show that third-party litigation financing generally furthers the
public values underlying the legal system.

188.

See WENDEL, supra note 144.
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